

# Education is a Remedy for Domestic Violence: Evidence from a Schooling Law Change\*

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## Abstract

We explore the relationship between female education and domestic violence by utilizing a change in compulsory schooling law and employing a regression-discontinuity design. The reform increased schooling by nearly 0.8 years for all women and 1.8 years for women raised in villages. Increased schooling for women reduces sexual and physical violence while social control behavior and financial control behavior remain unchanged. Improvements in marriage market outcomes seem to be the dominant channel through which female education affects domestic violence. Better education has improved partner quality, whereas women's gender attitudes and labor market outcomes have not changed.

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# 1 Introduction

Violence against women (VAW) is an important social problem in many developed and developing countries, and it constitutes a violation of women's basic human rights, at the least. One of the most common forms of violence women experience is the violence from an intimate partner. On average one of every three women in the world who has been in a relationship experienced violence from their intimate partners (World Health Organization and others (2013)).

The goal of this paper is to investigate the causal relationship between the education level of women and domestic violence experience by utilizing a change in compulsory schooling law in Turkey. Domestic abuse is rampant in Turkey. According to DESA (2010), 40% of women in Turkey had experienced some form of intimate partner violence. There is a negative correlation between education level and domestic violence experience. Those who have completed high school are two times less likely to be battered relative to those without any education or those with incomplete primary school education (KSGM (2015)). Education may affect the probability of experiencing violence through empowering women economically, challenging traditional gender roles and stereotypes, and improving their marriage market outcomes.

Economic empowerment of women is one of the most critical factors that may reduce domestic violence incidences against women. There are different hypotheses that try to explain the role of female economic empowerment in preventing domestic violence against women. One such explanation dictates that access to better employment opportunities, income and welfare payments increase women's bargaining power and outside option, thus rendering her unwilling to stay in an abusive relationship (Farmer and Tiefenthaler (2003), Stevenson and Wolfers (2006), Aizer (2010), Hidrobo and Fernald (2013)). From an alternative point of view, better social and economic position of women encourages their partners to use violence as an instrument as means to extract resources (Bloch and Rao (2002), Eswaran and Malhotra (2011), Bobonis et al. (2013), Agarwal and Panda (2007), and Erten and Keskin (2018)). Another view suggests that violence is a way to express male partners' frustration or stress, and a way to improve self-esteem. An improvement in the economic status of women may help men relieve financial stress, hence decrease violence. On the other hand, women's better economic conditions may threaten his social status. In this case, he will be more inclined to express those feelings by battering his partner (Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997)). So, the direction of the effects of education on domestic violence is not clear.

In societies with more traditional gender roles, women are at higher risk of violence (Jewkes (2002)). Education can help women through changing their views about traditional

gender norms and help them to take control of their life. Besides, education may also lead women to make better decisions about marriage and partner choice which may help reduce exposure to domestic violence (Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011)).

We investigate the effect of education on domestic violence using the change in the compulsory schooling law in 1997 in Turkey. Before 1997, the education system was composed of the mandatory component of five years of primary school, and the optional component of three years of junior high school and three years of high school. After the enforcement of the law in 1997-1998 school-year, students were to complete eight years of mandatory schooling before having an option to drop out. Therefore individuals born before January 1987 could drop out after their five years at school, whereas those who were born after January 1987 had to complete eighth grade. The compulsory schooling law required immediate enforcement and had a political motive, hence it serves as a natural experiment.

We use 2014 Turkey’s National Research on Domestic Violence against Women (TNRDVW) microdata set to estimate the causal effects of the 1997 compulsory schooling law on violence against women and channels through which education influences the violence outcomes. We adopt Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design approach and assign the status of “treated” based on the month and year of birth of women. Those who were born after January 1987 are assigned to the treatment group, while those who were born before January 1987 are assigned to the control group. In our primary analysis, we use the optimal bandwidth selection method suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman algorithm (IK) (Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)). We also check the robustness of our results by using an alternative bandwidth selection method via Calonico, Cattaneo, Titiunik algorithm (CCT) (Calonico et al. (2014)).

We, first, investigate the effect of the change in the compulsory schooling law on the schooling outcomes. Then, we examine whether the exogenous increase in schooling has any impact on physical, psychological and sexual violence, financial and social control behavior. Finally, we explore the potential channels through which the education and violence might be linked. We test whether the change in the compulsory schooling law had an impact on women’s attitudes towards gender norms and domestic abuse. Improvement in these attitudes coincides with women being more aware of their rights and growing less tolerant of remaining in an abusive relationship. Secondly, we consider the effect of education on marriage market outcomes. Thirdly, we examine how the labor market outcomes for women have changed as a result of the reform.

Our results suggest that the years of schooling for women who have ever had a relationship (ever been married, ever got engaged or ever had a boyfriend) increased by 0.825 years and

junior high school completion rate has gone up by 21.4 ppts.<sup>1</sup> Women who grew up in a village received 1.84 more years of schooling and junior high school completion rate for them has increased by 40 ppts as a result of the reform. We find no evidence of an increase in years of schooling for women who did not grow up in a village. We also provide evidence that the effect of the reform on male schooling is very limited relative to the effects on women's schooling (see Figure 5).

We introduce five categories of violence: physical (severe and mild), psychological, sexual, social control behavior and financial control behavior. We construct indexes for each category by averaging z-scores of dummies of having experienced an act of abuse under the relevant classes of violence. Our findings indicate a 17.9 and 13.2 ppts decrease in physical and sexual violence, respectively. The significant part of the decline in physical violence can be attributed to a 19.3 ppts reduction in severe physical violence. Physical violence (mainly stemming from a severe degree of violence) has decreased by 13.6 ppts (32.7 ppts) for women raised in a village. We also examine the causal channels that may be effective in reducing the violence experienced by women. We find evidence that the education reform had a positive effect on marriage market outcomes of women. Women's marriage decision rate has increased by 14.2 ppts - women became more likely to exercise their right to choose their partners. Also, the partner's employment probability and years of schooling have increased by 9.2 ppts and 0.71 years respectively, and the partner's propensity of having experienced violence during his childhood has declined. The effects of the reform on marriage outcomes for the women who grew up in a village are more pronounced. The partners' years of schooling and the women's probability of making their own marriage decisions have increased by 1.73 years and 25.9 ppts, respectively, in the village subsample. However, we fail to find any significant effect of the reform on women's labor market outcomes and attitudes towards gender norms. Though, we find that women's opinions on consent for sexual intercourse with an intimate partner improved for women who grew up in a village.

As a robustness check, we used the 2008 and 2014 TNRDVW micro datasets together to confirm that the decrease in the domestic violence exposure of women who are affected by the reform is not due to they being young relative to those who have not affected by the reform. We also adopt a difference-in-differences approach and confirm our findings.

To our knowledge, the first and the only work that examines the causal effect of education on domestic violence is Erten and Keskin (2018).<sup>2</sup> They use the same education reform and the earlier cycle of the data we use in this study, namely the 2008 Turkey's National Survey on

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<sup>1</sup>In Table 2 and Figure 3, we show that the education reform did not affect the selection into having a partner.

<sup>2</sup>Gulesci et al. (2018) investigates the effects of children's schooling on mother's attitude towards domestic violence against women in Turkey.

Domestic Violence against Women dataset. Their findings suggest that the increased years of schooling due to the increase in the compulsory schooling year increases psychological violence and financial control behavior experienced by women raised in rural areas significantly. However, they report no significant changes in physical or sexual violence as a result of the reform. While they report a positive relationship between increased years of schooling and labor market outcomes, there is no evidence on whether the education law had a significant effect on domestic violence attitudes. As Erten and Keskin (2018) use the survey data collected in 2008, the oldest respondents that were affected by the reform were at the age of 21 at the time of the survey. Given the nature of the question at hand, we can only analyze women who have ever had a relationship. While education is shown to not affect selection into having a relationship, there may be unobservable factors that may affect relationship status which are correlated with the probability of being exposed to violence. We observe a negative correlation between marriage age and violence measures, those who got married at early ages are more likely to experience violence. As a result, we argue that the results in Erten and Keskin (2018) might have been driven by the fact that the treatment group includes women who got married or had a relationship at early ages, before 21 years-old.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, using the 2014 TNRDVW dataset to investigate the causal effect of education on domestic violence provides more reliable estimates as the oldest respondent was 27 years-old in 2014.<sup>4</sup> Besides, the women in our sample on average spent around five more years in their marriages which should exhibit a longer-run effect of education on intimate partner violence. Also, using two datasets together, 2008 and 2014 TNRDVW datasets, allows us to use alternative methods to check the robustness of the results. Essentially, contrary to Erten and Keskin (2018)’s results, we show that there is a negative causal relationship between education and domestic violence against women. The primary causal channel in reducing the violence is the marriage market. More educated women are better at differentiating partners, thus have “higher quality” husbands and experience less violence.

Amaral (2017) is a closely related paper that investigates the effect of improved inheritance rights on the violence against women by using an exogenous change in the inheritance legislation in India. The change in inheritance law increased women’s property rights and economically empowered them. Their results suggest that the women affected by the law are less likely to face spousal violence. The mechanism that decreases the violence is found to be

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<sup>3</sup>We reestimate the effects of education on domestic violence by using 2008 TNRDVW dataset. The results are presented in Table A.15 and Table A.16. These results are consistent with Erten and Keskin (2018)’s results.

<sup>4</sup>In the sample within the bandwidth, 61, used in Erten and Keskin (2018), 55.4% of the women are married, and 79.19% of the women have ever had a relationship, these numbers in our sample are 81.3 and 91.2, respectively.

the improved marriage market match: women benefiting from the amendment are more likely to marry higher quality men. They also provide evidence that the decision-making power of beneficiary women increases. These results are consistent with our findings. La Mattina (2017) is another paper that shows the importance of marriage market match on the probability of violence against women. They explore the causal effect of civil conflict on domestic violence in Rwanda. The conflict decreased the number of surviving men relative to women giving them bargaining power in the marriage market. Their results show that genocide intensity increased the probability of intimate partner violence by 5.02 ppts.

We also contribute the literature that investigates the causal channels of domestic violence against women. Bobonis et al. (2013), Angelucci (2008) and Hidrobo and Fernald (2013) investigates the effects of conditional cash transfers on the probability of domestic violence incidences. We also contribute the literature that investigates the effect of different policies that are aimed to reduce violence against women. Aizer and Dal Bo (2009) present the evidence that no-drop-policies<sup>5</sup> reduce the number of men murdered by intimates but it does not reduce violence against women. Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) examines the effects of unilateral divorce laws on domestic violence and show that adoption of unilateral divorce laws decreases female suicide rates, domestic violence incidences and the rates of females murdered by their partners. Tauchen and Witte (1995) investigate how police treatments while handling domestic violence calls affect the subsequent violence. They suggest that arrest is more effective than counseling or short-term separation. On the other hand, Iyengar (2009) shows mandatory arrest laws that are used in many states in the U.S. increase intimate partner homicides.

We also contribute to the vast body of literature on the causal effects of the change in the compulsory schooling law on different outcome variables such as marriage market matching (Hener and Wilson (2018)), earnings (Angrist and Keueger (1991)), child's educational outcomes, drop-out decisions (Oreopoulos (2006) ,Oreopoulos (2007)), health (Jürges et al. (2013)), fertility decisions (Black et al. (2008), Güneş (2016)) by presenting a new evidence on the effects of education on violence against women. The part of this paper overlap with the previous works that uses the change in 1997 Compulsory Schooling Law in Turkey such as attitudes toward gender inequality (Dinçer et al. (2014)) and decision rights over marriage and time of marriage (Gulesci and Meyersson (2015)), however, the focus of this paper is to identify the effect of education on domestic violence against women and its causal channels.

In this paper, we use self-reported violence data to identify the effect of education on intimate partner violence. We should note that this may create biased results if there are

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<sup>5</sup>This policy stipulates that once a woman brings charges against a batterer, the prosecution will continue regardless of her stated wishes to drop the charges.

differences in reporting violent behaviors according to education levels. It is not possible to rule out this problem, however, to alleviate the possible concerns we checked how education affects women’s view about whether men can use violence in certain situations and we cannot find any significant effects. Ideally, one should use administrative data to study violence against women, however, the estimates obtained from such kind of data set would suffer from reporting bias even more, especially in developing countries like Turkey where violence against women is seen as a private family matter<sup>6</sup> and usually it is not reported to police. In our data set, only %7.25 of the women who have ever experienced violence made a legal application to police. In addition, measuring psychological violence or social control behaviors through administrative data is impossible. Our study provides an evidence of the effect of education on partner’s violence behavior by using one of the most comprehensive studies on domestic violence against women.

The organization of the paper is as follows: Next section gives the necessary background about the 1997 Basic Education Reform, Section 3 presents the details and the summary statistics of the data used. Section 4 discusses model and identification strategy, and Section 5 and Section 6 presents the results and investigates causal channels through which education effects domestic violence, respectively. Section 7 discusses and checks the robustness of the result by using difference-in-differences strategy. Section 8 concludes.

## 2 Background: 1997 Basic Education Reform

In Turkey, education has been managed by the central government entity since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The Ministry of National Education is in charge of all structural reforms and education policies.

Prior to 1997, basic education<sup>7</sup> in Turkey consisted of five years of primary school and three years of junior high school. The primary school was compulsory, while the latter was voluntary. Following the primary school, students could choose to study in general, vocational and religious schools. Turkey’s laws required the education to be provided only in Turkish, in a coeducational setting, particularly prohibited wearing headscarf, even in religious schools. This practice, however, had often been neglected in religious schools.

In the light of growing political power, an Islamist party eventually won the 1995 Turkish Grand National Assembly (the parliament) elections, which would be followed by a conflict with secular groups, notably centered in military and judiciary.

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<sup>6</sup>In Turkey, Violence Against Women Is Often A Private Family Matter”<http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/06/02/41>

<sup>7</sup>Basic education refers to the education of children between the age of seven to fourteen which is introduced to Turkish education system with the 1961 Basic Education Law (No. 222) (Sasmaz (2015)).

In 1997, the military decided to intervene with the new set of laws to prevent the spread of Islamist rule. On February 1997, the National Security Council announced the adoption of eighteen amendments in law. One of them, namely Law No. 4306, stated that the compulsory schooling would be extended from five years to eight. This would not only serve as means to better education but also would cease the validity of religious schools. The enforcement mechanism was the abolition of the five-year primary school diploma. Instead, an eight-year diploma would be awarded to students who completed eighth grade of primary-school. As primary school diploma has critical importance in the future outcomes of students, this change created a strong incentive for students and their families.

The subjects of the compulsory schooling law were determined by the school starting age. Those who completed fifth grade in 1997 were given the option to drop out, whereas those who finished fourth grade and would start fifth grade in the 1997-1998 academic year would have to complete eight years to earn the diploma. Therefore individuals born before January 1987 would be exempt from the new enactment, while those who were born after January 1987 would have to complete eight grades. Despite imperfect compliance with the law, fails and repetitions of grades, vast majority followed the new structure.

Apart from legal amendments, a considerable amount of funds has been invested to enable this scale of education. Within just a few years 82000 classrooms were built and 70000 instructors were recruited. In order to improve the access of students in rural areas, school buses were launched to remote districts under the Bused Primary Education Scheme (Ministry of National Education (2011) and Dulger (2004)).

The schooling law had an impressive impact on primary school enrollment rates. The net enrollment rate in primary school increased from 84.74 in 1997-1998 academic year to 93.54 in 1999-2000 academic year. The increase in enrollment rates for females (78.97 to 88.45) was greater than males (90.25 to 98.41). The sex ratio in primary education also increased from 85.63 to 88.54 (Ministry of National Education (2011)).

### 3 Data

In this study, we use 2014 Turkey's National Research on Domestic Violence against Women (TNRDVW) microdata set in our main analysis. We use the first wave of the same survey, 2008 TNRDVW, for the robustness checks. The survey has nation-wide representativeness with a sample size of 15084 households. Interviewers in 2014 visited these households, and they complete face-to-face interviews. Only one woman, aged 15-59, was chosen randomly from each household, regardless of whether she had been married, in a relationship (engaged, boyfriend) or neither. That woman was interviewed and included in the

sample. To collect the data most reliably and to ensure the safety of the interviewee and the interviewer, the Ethical and Safety guidelines developed by the World Health Organization was followed.

The survey includes information on the household population and the housing characteristics, background characteristics, marriage history, general health and reproductive health of the women, behavioral problems of their children, background characteristics and behavioral patterns of the husband/partner, and the information on the physical, sexual and psychological acts of violence, social and financial control experienced by women from their husbands/partners, their relationship with individuals other than their husband/partners and opinions of women on gender norms.

We will only use the subsample of women who have ever been married or ever had a relationship (engaged or had a boyfriend), since those who never were in a relationship would trivially not experience violence from an intimate partner, which is the primary goal of this study. We defined five categories of domestic violence: physical violence, psychological violence, sexual violence, social control behavior, and financial control behavior.

We divide the physical violence into two subcategories by the severity of the act of abuse: severe and mild. Severe degree of physical violence is specified as the respondent having ever been kicked, dragged, beaten, choked, burned or threatened with a weapon or a knife by any of her partners. The mild degree of physical violence is defined by the respondent having ever been slapped, pushed, shoved, got hair pulled or punched by any of her partners. Physical violence includes acts of both severe and mild categories. This distinction allows us to examine the physical violence outcomes in greater detail. One would expect a partner to exert mild acts of violence as an instrument. On the other hand, the acts of violence with severe health damage by a partner might be traced to a behavioral or mental disorder.

Psychological violence is measured by the interviewee having been insulted, belittled, humiliated, scared or intimidated by her partner on purpose. Sexual violence is specified as the respondent having ever been forced to have sex, do humiliating sexual things or had intercourse with the partner due to fear. Social control behavior is specified by whether the respondent's partner has ever prevented her contact from her family, her contact from her friends, insists on knowing where she is, gets angry if she speaks to another man, is suspicious that she is unfaithful, demands permission for seeking health care, intervenes in her clothes and intervenes in her social network usage. Financial control behavior is defined by whether the respondent's partner has ever prevented her from working, refused to give her money or took her earnings. We specify the violence measures by averaging the z-scores of dummies of having experienced an act of abuse under the relevant classes of violence by following Duflo et al. (2007), Kling et al. (2007) and Erten and Keskin (2018).

Table 1 reports summary statistics for 19-35-year-old women. Columns (1)-(3) lists means, standard deviations and the number of observations for women who have ever had a relationship, and whose childhood region is a village and a non-village area, respectively<sup>8</sup>. Column (4) reports the differences between columns (3) and (2). We first present schooling outcomes. In Turkey, average schooling of women in our sample who have ever had a relationship is 8.27 years. However, there is a statistically significant difference in the years of schooling between the village and the non-village subsamples. While the women who have grown up in a village have on average 6.66 years of schooling, the women raised in a non-village area have 9.06 years of schooling resulting a 2.4 years of difference. Also while 95 percent of women in our sample completed at least primary school, only 60 percent of them finished at least a junior high school. The difference between the junior high school completion rate between the village and the non-village subsample is 27 ppts, 69.5 percent of the non-village sample and 42 percent of the village sample completed at least a junior high school. Similarly, the high school completion and the college completion rates are significantly higher for non-village subsample.

We, next, present the summary statistics for domestic violence incidences. Each of the violence indexes is constructed by averaging the z-scores of dummies of having experienced an act of abuse under the relevant classes of violence as described above. A higher value of an index indicates a higher level of domestic violence. Table 1 shows that village women are more exposed to domestic violence than their non-village counterparts. For all type of violence indexes, except financial control behavior, village women on average have a higher domestic violence index, and they are significantly more likely to be exposed to physical, especially mild physical violence, and sexual violence. For the financial control behavior, the difference is very small and not significant.

Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables that are related to the potential channels through which education can affect women’s probability to be exposed to domestic violence, women’s gender attitudes, labor market outcomes, and marriage market outcomes. Each of the statement about gender attitudes adjusted so that if it is one, the woman has a more gender equal view. Gender attitudes index is constructed by averaging z-scores of the variable related to each of the statements. Again, larger values correspond to a more equal stance. 68 percent of the women raised in a non-village area states that a woman can argue with her husband, however, 59 percent of the women raised in a village share the same view. While 67 percent of the women in non-village subsample disagree with the statement ”Men

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<sup>8</sup>In our data, we do not have enough information on the childhood region to divide our sample into rural and urban subsamples. Therefore, to be on the safe ground, we divide our sample into village and non-village subsamples which we have information on.

are responsible for women's actions" 56 percent of the women in village sample disagree with the statement. Reflecting those views, gender attitudes index of the women raised in a non-village area is 17 ppts higher than the gender index of the women raised in a village. So, women in non-village subsample have more gender-equal views relative to women in village subsample. Next, we examine the labor market outcomes and the ownership index of the women. In our sample, only 28 percent of the women are employed and 20 percent of them is employed in the service sector. There are significant differences between women in village subsample and non-village subsample. The women who have grown up in a non-village area are 5 ppts more likely to be employed and 9 ppts more likely to have social security relative to the women who raised in a village<sup>9</sup>. We construct the ownership index by averaging the z-scores of variables that indicate whether the women have financial assets that generate income such as land, house, company/business, vehicle, bank savings and other<sup>10</sup>. The higher the ownership index, the more possessions the women have. The ownership index of the women raised in a non-village area is significantly higher than the ownership index of the women raised in a village.

Finally, we examine the marriage-related characteristics of the women in our sample. The data only includes information about last partners of the respondents. Therefore, the statistics presented in Table 1 is related to the last partner. We aggregate information on the addictive behavior of the partner and the asset ownership of the household. The partner's addictive behavior index comprises of the average of z-scores of drinking, smoking, drug abuse and gambling behavior, and the household asset ownership index is the average of z-scores of the variables that indicate whether the respondents have refrigerator, dishwasher, cell phone, private car, etc. In our sample average marriage age of women is 20.65. There is a small but significant difference between the women in the village and the non-village subsample regarding the marriage age: an average woman raised in a non-village area marry 0.68 years after an average woman raised in a village. What is more striking is only 48 percent of the women raised in a village made their own marriage decision, however, 65 percent of the women in the non-village subsample made their own marriage decision. The difference is 16 ppt. The characteristics of the last partner of the women raised in a non-village area are also better in several dimensions. They are more likely to have more schooling, more likely to have a college or high school degree, and their addictive behavior index is lower which means they are less likely to gamble or use a drug. However, in terms of the divorce or remarrying rates, age difference, partners' employment rates, there is no difference between

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<sup>9</sup>In Turkey, in general women's labor force participation rate and the employment rate are low. In 2014, women's labor force participation rate was 33.6 percent, and the employment rate was 29.5 percent.

<sup>10</sup>See Appendix A for the explanation of the variables.

the village and non-village subsample.

In the next section, we describe our model and identification strategy.

## 4 Model and Identification

We use the Regression Discontinuity design to identify the effects of education on several domestic violence measures by using the change in compulsory schooling law. Since the law was to be enforced starting from an exact date, January 1987, regardless of individual preference, treatment status (mandated to receive additional three years of schooling) is assigned randomly and due to the political motive of the reform, manipulation of the requirements for the treatment is impossible. Therefore, our identifying assumption is that individuals that were born one month apart before and after January 1987 do not display any systematic differences other than being forced to complete either five or eight years of compulsory schooling. We use the birth-month of individuals as the forcing variable of the model. We regard January 1987 as the cutoff to investigate the causal effect of the law. We estimate a basic RD model as in Erten and Keskin (2018) and Gulesci and Meyersson (2012):

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta t_i + f(x_i, t_i) + \varepsilon_i$$

$$\forall x_i \in (c - h, c + h)$$

where  $y_i$  is the independent variable,  $t_i$  is a dummy variable that shows treatment status,  $x_i$  is forcing variable,  $c$  is the cutoff point, and  $h$  is the bandwidth around the cutoff point. The control function  $f(x_i, t_i)$  is a continuous  $n^{th}$  order polynomial function in forcing variable on each side of the cutoff point.

We use local linear regression in RD estimations ((Imbens and Lemieux, 2008)) along with the optimal bandwidth, calculated via Imbens and Kalyanaraman algorithm (IK) (Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).) As a robustness check, we re-estimate our model by using the optimal bandwidth calculated via Calonico, Cattaneo, Titiunik algorithm (CCT) (Calonico et al. (2014)). We cluster standard errors at the month-year of the birth level to accommodate specification error in the forcing variable as suggested in Lee and Card (2008). In all regressions, we include the following control variables: a dummy variable if the mother-tongue is Turkish, month-of-birth fixed effects, a dummy variable for having grown up in a village area, childhood region fixed effects and their interactions.

In addition to presenting reduced-form estimates from the above model, we also use treatment status as an instrument for the years of schooling and present fuzzy RD results for all outcome variables of interest.

## 4.1 Preliminary Checks

The validity of the Regression Discontinuity design depends on two critical assumptions (Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010)). First one is the assumption that individuals have imprecise control over the assignment variable. To check the validity of the assumption, we perform the McCrary density test on the density of the forcing variable and hypothesize that the estimated kernel density of the month-year of birth is not continuous around the cutoff (McCrary (2008)). As shown in Figure 1, we reject the null hypothesis, the density of the forcing variable is continuous around the cutoff.

The second assumption we have to validate is the assumption that the treatment status is assigned randomly. Therefore, the individuals' around the cutoff should have characteristics similar to each other which imply characteristics that are not affected by the reform should have a continuous distribution around the cutoff. Therefore, we check for discontinuities in the densities of covariates. We inspect the continuity of covariates in Figure 2. In each graph, the local averages of the covariates in monthly bins have been plotted against year and month of birth. January 1987 is appointed as the cutoff and lines represent local linear fits and respective 95% confidence intervals. We find no discontinuity in any of the covariates around the cutoff. Table 2 lists the RD estimates for the covariates and confirm that there is no evidence of any significant discontinuities in covariate densities.

In this paper, we focus on a sample of women who have ever had a relationship as they are the potential victims of intimate partner violence. In this case, one can concern about the endogenous selection into the group of women who have ever had a relationship. If the education reform had a significant effect on the relationship status of women, the effects of the education reform on the domestic violence outcomes would not be identified. In Table 2 and Figure 3, we show that there is no significant discontinuity in the marriage probability and probability to have a relationship around the cutoff.

## 5 Results

In this section, we first start by examining the effects of the compulsory schooling law on education outcomes and, then we proceed to investigate domestic violence outcomes and the potential causal channels.

### 5.1 Schooling Outcomes

Our main goal is to evaluate the effects of schooling on the domestic violence outcomes. However, to be able to do so we should first examine whether the change in the compulsory

schooling law had any effect on schooling outcomes, and who the main beneficiaries of the law are. Table 3 reports the schooling effects of the reform on the sample of all women and the subsample of women who have ever had a relationship – who are or have ever been married, engaged and have a boyfriend. We perform linear RD regressions, using schooling outcomes such as years of schooling, a dummy that takes value one if the respondent has completed junior high school, high school, and college as dependent variables. We use the month of birth as the forcing variable and include respondents’ mother tongue, the month of birth fixed effects, the dummy variable that indicates the childhood area is a village, the childhood region fixed effects and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Table 3 lists the average treatment effect estimates of local linear and quadratic regressions within IK bandwidth,  $\hat{h}$ ,  $2\hat{h}$ , and  $\hat{h}/2$ .

The results suggest that, for the sample of all women, the compulsory schooling law has increased the total years of schooling and the junior high school completion rate by 0.793 years and 21 ppts, respectively. Years of schooling for women who have ever had a relationship have increased by 0.825 years which is a 10 percent increase relative to the mean. Also, a 21.4 ppts increase in junior high school completion rate and an 11.1 ppts increase in high school completion rate reaffirms the significant effect of the reform on education for the subsample of women that we target.

We further investigate the effect of the law on the subgroups of women who have ever had a relationship to understand the heterogeneous effect of the law on women who grew up in villages and non-village areas. Table 4 presents the RD treatment effect estimates for the schooling outcomes of the two subsamples, village, and non-village. The results show that the years of schooling for women who grew up in a village increased by 1.842 years, a 27.5 percent increase relative to the mean. In addition, the education reform increased those women’s junior high school completion rate by 40 ppts, high school completion rate by 23.3 ppts and the college completion rate by 10.8 ppts. On the other hand, the reform does not have any significant effect on the completed school years for women who grew up in a non-village area, though it increased junior high school completion rate by 14.9 ppts.

We also check the robustness of these results with a static bandwidth, 98, the bandwidth calculated for the years of schooling of women who have ever had a relationship, and the bandwidths that we calculate by using the Calonico, Cattaneo, Titiunik algorithm (CCT) (Calonico et al. (2014)). Table A.1 and A.2 presents the results using the static bandwidth of 98 around the cutoff. Table A.8 and A.9 shows the treatment effect estimates within the CCT bandwidths. Although we lose efficiency in the estimates for the sample of all women and women who have ever had a relationship due to the smaller number of observations in Table A.8 and A.9, the magnitudes of the estimates are consistent across different bandwidth

selection methods. Our results are also consistent with those of Gulesci and Meyersson (2012), Dinger et al. (2014) and Erten and Keskin (2018).

These results clearly show that the main beneficiaries of the education reform are the women who grew up in a village, which is not surprising given their low-level of schooling outcomes. As we present in column 7 of Table 4, while women who grew up in a village had on average 6.66 years of schooling, the women who grew up in non-village areas had on average 9.06 years of schooling. Therefore, in proceeding sections, we investigate women whose childhood area is a village separately.

We also conduct a placebo test to confirm that the increase in the schooling is due to the change in the compulsory schooling law. In Figure 4, we graphically illustrate the RD treatment and placebo effects using 2008 and 2014 TNSDVW data sets. On the right-hand side, we present the average completed years of schooling of the treatment and control groups in monthly bins by using 2014 TNSDVW data set. It is clear that there is a jump in the years of schooling of treatment group. The graph on the left-hand side plot the same relation for the same aged women, 27-28 years-old, by using 2008 TNSDVW data set. The cutoff, in this case, corresponds to being born before and after January 1981. The graph shows that there is no significant jump in the schooling level of women of the same age in the 2008 TNSDVW sample. The nonexistence of a jump around the cutoff of January 1981 assures that the education reform drives the discontinuity in the schooling level of the women in 2014 sample.

## 5.2 Domestic Violence Outcomes

In this section, we examine the effects of the reform on domestic violence outcomes. We use physical violence (severe and mild degrees), psychological violence, sexual violence, social control behavior and financial control behavior as our domestic violence outcomes. As we describe in Section 3, we construct each of the violence measures by averaging z-scores of subcategories of violence caused by last partners. We use violence indexes as dependent variables while using month-year of birth as the forcing variable. We run OLS, local linear RD, and 2SLS regressions to estimate the effect of the education reform. Aside from women who have had a relationship, we also restrict our attention to the subgroup of women who have grown up in a village. OLS estimates capture general trends, while local linear RD (sharp RD) and 2SLS (fuzzy RD) estimates capture the effect of the reform within the optimal bandwidth obtained via IK algorithm. We include respondents' mother tongue, month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood type of settlement (village/non-village) dummies and their interactions as controls.

Table 5 reports the regression estimates for the domestic violence indexes. Column (1) lists OLS estimates, columns (2) and (3) list local linear RD and fuzzy RD estimates. Columns (4)-(6) report the estimates mentioned above for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Included below the point estimates are standard errors, means, optimal bandwidths and the number of observations for each regression.<sup>11</sup>

The first column of Table 5 shows that for all type of violence measures there is a negative and significant correlation between violence outcomes and the years of schooling. According to these estimates, a one year increase in schooling decreases physical violence by 2.7 ppts, psychological violence by 2.2 ppts, sexual violence by 2.1 ppts, social control behavior by 2.1 ppts. and the financial control behavior by 2.5 ppts. However, these results do not provide any information about the causal effect of the years of schooling on the domestic violence outcomes as several factors may affect both schooling and the domestic violence outcomes of a woman. Therefore, we present RD and fuzzy RD estimates in column 2 and 3, respectively, which provide the causal effect of increased years of schooling on domestic violence measures. RD estimates for physical violence, severe and mild, psychological violence, sexual violence are negative and significant. The causal effect of the increase in the years of schooling due to the reform is 16 ppt reduction in physical violence, 12.7 ppts reduction in psychological violence, and 15 ppt reduction in sexual violence from the last partner. 2SLS estimates presented in column 3 also confirm these results. However, the increased years of schooling is not causally associated with social and financial control behavior. The estimates based on the subsample of women who grew up in a village, presented in columns (4)-(6), also shows that increased years of schooling decreases women's exposure to physical and sexual violence from the intimate partner. One important point that is worth to mention is that the decrease in the physical violence outcome of women raised in a village is primarily driven by the decline in the severe physical violence which is specified as the respondent having ever been kicked, dragged, beaten, choked, burned or threatened with a weapon or a knife rather than mild physical violence which is defined as the respondent having ever been slapped, pushed, shoved, got hair pulled or punched by any of her partners. For women who grew up in a village, physical violence declined by 13.6 ppts, which mainly stems from a 32.7 ppts decrease in the severe degree of physical violence. As severe physical violence might be more related to behavioral or mental disorders of the partner, these results might be an evidence that there are structural changes in the characteristics of partners which we will investigate in the next section. The estimates we get by using the treatment dummy as the instrument for schooling presented in column 6 also confirm the RD results.

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<sup>11</sup>Violence measures are constructed by using the whole sample. Therefore the mean of a violence measure need not be zero within the optimal bandwidth around the cutoff.

We also examine the effect of the reform on domestic violence from any partner. Again we observe a negative relationship between violence outcomes and education (see Table 6). While the increased years of schooling lead to a 14.8 ppts decrease in physical violence for the whole sample, it leads to a 19.4 ppt reduction in physical violence, a 32.1 ppt decrease in severe physical violence, and a 19.2 ppts decrease in sexual violence for women in the village subsample.

To check the robustness of our results, we re-estimate our model by using the static bandwidth, 98, and the bandwidths that we calculate by using the Calonico, Cattaneo, Titiunik algorithm (CCT) (Calonico et al. (2014)). Table A.3 and A.16 list the results of the regressions performed with static bandwidth of 98, and Table A.10 and A.11 present the estimation results obtained by using the CCT bandwidths for the last partner and any partner, respectively. It is assuring that our results are robust to different bandwidth selection methods.

As an additional robustness check, we construct an alternative violence measure. We define a dummy variable for each category of violence which is equal to one if the women experience any act of abuse under the relevant classes of violence. That is, if a violence measure is zero, this would mean that the respondent has not experienced any act of violence from a partner related to that type of violence. By defining violence measures in that way, we ignore the prevalence of each act of violence and we put the women who have experienced many different acts of abuse and women who have experienced just one kind of violent act in the same category. However, the results are still consistent with our previous findings<sup>12</sup>.

We also conduct a placebo test to confirm that there is no systematic relation between age and domestic violence outcomes which can drive our results. Figure 6 graphically illustrates the placebo treatment effects using 2008 TNSDVW data set. The figure presents the average of the z-scores of the related violence outcomes of the treatment and control groups in monthly bins by using 2008 TNSDVW data set for the 27-28 years-old women, women of the same age who are affected by the reform in 2014 sample. The cutoff, in this case, corresponds to being born before and after January 1981. The graph shows that there is no significant jump in domestic violence outcomes of women who have born before and after January 1981 in the 2008 TNSDVW sample. The nonexistence of a jump around the cutoff of January 1981 assures that the discontinuity in the domestic violence outcomes of the women in 2014 sample is driven by the education reform.

The increased years of schooling due to the change in the compulsory schooling law had a significant impact on fighting domestic violence by decreasing physical and sexual violence experienced by women. The effect of the reform on physical violence was by a larger margin

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<sup>12</sup>These results are available upon request.

for women who grew up in a village. To refine our analysis we investigate the channels that link education and domestic violence in the next section.

## 6 Causal Channels

We have established the negative causal relationship between education and domestic violence. In this section, we examine the causal channels through which education reduces domestic violence. We investigate three main channels that can potentially have an effect on women’s domestic violence outcomes: Gender attitudes, marriage market outcomes, and labor market outcomes

### 6.1 Gender Attitudes

In this section, we investigate the effect of increased female education on women’s attitudes towards gender norms. Women with more traditional gender norms are more prone to violence and they are more likely to blame themselves for the assault (Finn (1986), Flood and Pease (2009)). If the increased years of schooling lead women to have more gender-equal views, through this channel it might have decreased the women’s exposure to domestic violence.

Table 7 reports the regression results for the variables that reflect women’s gender attitudes. Firstly, we observe a positive relationship between schooling and gender-equal attitudes based on OLS estimates. An additional year of schooling increases the probability of women not condone violence from intimate partners by 2.5 ppt which are 4 percent more than the average. Secondly, we cannot find any evidence that the education reform had a causal impact on attitudes toward gender norms for the whole sample. For women raised in a village, the opinions on consent for sexual intercourse with an intimate partner improved by 4.3 ppt with the increased years of schooling, which enables us to postulate an explanation about the decline in sexual violence discussed in Section 5. The last row of Table 7 lists the results for the overall gender attitudes index and we fail to find any evidence of a change in women’s general attitudes towards gender norms. We check the robustness of these results by using static bandwidth of 98 and using the CCT bandwidths, presented in Table A.5 and Table A.12, respectively. The results are consistent across all three bandwidth selection methods.

Overall, our findings exhibit no significant change in women’s attitudes toward husband’s right to use violence and gender attitudes index. These results also provide evidence that there is no differential reporting of violent behaviors according to education levels as the

increased years of schooling does not have any significant effect on the women's attitudes towards more equal gender norms.

## 6.2 Marriage Market Outcomes

We continue by exploring the effects of the compulsory schooling law on marriage market outcomes of women. Increased years of schooling of women might have an impact on their intimate partner choices and partner's characteristics. If increased education level improved partner's quality, women's exposure to domestic violence might change through this channel.

The results and analysis in this section are attributed to explaining the causal relationship between female education and domestic violence from last partner as our data only includes information about last partners of the respondents. Table 8 shows the results for the sample of women who have ever had a relationship in column (1) to (3) and for the sample of women who have grown up in a village in column (4) to (6). The OLS estimates presented in column (1) show that schooling is positively correlated with marriage age, marriage decision, partner's years of schooling, partner's college and high school completion rates. On the other hand, it is negatively correlated with schooling differences between partners and the husband's addictive behavior index which is comprised of averaging z-scores of drinking, smoking, drug abuse and gambling behavior. Similar patterns are presented in Column (4) for the village subsample.

According to the RD treatment effects, located in columns (2)-(3) of Table 8, the education reform increased the probability of women making her own marriage decision by 14.2 ppt. Partner's years of schooling and propensity of being employed has increased by 0.71 years and 9.2 ppt, which correspond to 7.57 percent and 10 percent improvement relative to the mean, respectively. Moreover, the likelihood of the partner having experienced violence while being raised has decreased by 10.8 ppt.<sup>13</sup> Estimates obtained from local linear RD regressions outperform IV in terms of efficiency, despite IV estimates being consistent with the former. The results for the village subsample show that the reform increased women's probability to make their own marriage decision by 25.9 ppt which shows that reform empower women so that they have more say in to whom they marry. In addition, the effect of the reform on the partner's years of schooling and propensity of being employed increased by 1.73 year and 7.5 ppt, respectively. It is important to note that the increase in the years of schooling of partners for both whole sample and the village subsample is very close to the increase in the years of schooling of the women which are 0.825 and 1.842 years, respectively. (see Table 3 and 4). These findings show that there is positive assortative mating by years

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<sup>13</sup>Increased years of schooling may affect the marriage market prospect of women either through extending the network of women or improving their marital foresight so that they can make better choices.

of schooling in the marriage market in Turkey<sup>14</sup>. To understand whether the increased education level of men or women induce the results, we investigate the effect of the reform on men’s schooling. Figure 5 shows the treatment effects of the reform on men’s and women’s junior high school completion rate by using the household survey of 2014 TNRDVW.<sup>15</sup> As it is evident from Figure 5, the reform does not have a clear effect on the men’s junior high school completion rate. The same results are confirmed by Erten and Keskin (2018) using the 2014 Household Labor Force Survey data which includes the month of birth information. In addition, in Table 1, we present that an average Turkish woman marries a man who is 4.4 years older than herself which implies most men in the potential partner pool of a woman are not affected by the reform. These findings all together show that the increase in the partners’ education level caused by the effect of the reform on the women’s years of schooling.<sup>16</sup>

We argue that women’s improved partner quality reduce their exposure to domestic violence. We find that the decline in physical violence acts mostly stems from the reduction of those with severe health damage. Partners who use violence as an instrument to control women should be more likely to use mild physical or psychological violence. However, partners’ use of severe physical violence for exerting control over resources is less intuitive, since it also hinders women’s ability to work. Therefore, increased education for women enhanced their marital foresight and partner selection competence.

### 6.3 Labor Market Outcomes

We continue our analysis by examining the effect of the change in the compulsory schooling law on labor market outcomes for women. If the additional years of schooling increased women’s employment probability and income, this change might decrease women’s exposure to violence by improving their outside option and increasing the threat point of women. (Farmer and Tiefenthaler (2003), Stevenson and Wolfers (2006), Aizer (2010), Hidrobo and Fernald (2013)). In our analysis, we include information on women’s employment status, sector of employment, social security status and ownership of financial assets that generate income such as land, house, company, etc.<sup>17</sup>

The results are presented in Table 9. The OLS estimates indicate a positive relationship between education and labor market outcomes. An additional year of schooling implies a

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<sup>14</sup>Mare (1991) and Pencavel (1998) finds that there is positive assortative mating with respect to education level in the US.

<sup>15</sup>We do not observe the month of birth, and the years of schooling of the individuals in the household sample, therefore, we use junior high school completion rate as the schooling outcome and age bins.

<sup>16</sup>Our results are consistent with the findings of Benham (1974), Lefgren and McIntyre (2006), Anderberg and Zhu (2014), Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011) and McCrary and Royer (2011).

<sup>17</sup>The survey data does not contain information about women or household income.

higher probability of better labor market position and more access to financial assets, and less probability of being employed in the agricultural sector. However, we find no evidence of a significant change caused by the education reform. We confirm these results in Table A.6 and Table A.13 which present the estimation results obtained by using static bandwidth, 98, and the CCT bandwidth, respectively. These results refute the positive effect of the compulsory schooling law on access to resources and economic empowerment of women that are presented in Erten and Keskin (2018). These differences in findings can be explained by the improved earning potential of partners presented in the previous section. While the increased years of schooling of women are expected to increase their labor supply, the increase in the partners' earning potential may decrease it (Mincer (1962)). As a result, these two opposing factors may negate each other and remove the positive effect that is found in Erten and Keskin (2018).

## 7 Robustness Check

### 7.0.1 Cohort Effect

In our analysis, we compare 19-27 year-old women treated by the reform to those 28-35 year-old women not exposed to the reform. We showed that there are no differences in terms of observed background attributes of these two groups. However, it can still be argued that some unobservable factors might have affected younger women so that they experienced less violence. To address this concern, we use the two cycles of the same data set, namely the 2008 and 2014 Domestic Violence against Women data set, and use the differential exposure of the same cohorts to the reform in different survey years.

Table 10 presents exposure to the reform according to the year of birth, presented in the first column, in 2008 and 2014 survey years. The 22 to 27-year-old women in 2014 survey year are treated by the reform, however, the same cohort in 2008 survey year is not exposed to the reform. The first two columns of Table 11 present the summary statistics for this cohort in 2008 and 2014 sample, while column three presents the differences in their background characteristics. As expected, the sample of women extracted from 2014 sample, who are affected by the reform, have on average 1.06 years more schooling.

We extract 22 to 27-year-old women from the 2008 survey data and the same age group from the 2014 survey data to check whether our results could have been driven by the cohort effect. We pooled these data sets and create treatment dummy which is equal to 1 for those who are surveyed in 2014. We use instrumental variable regression to analyze the effects of the reform on schooling outcomes and our violence measures for the last partner. The results

are presented in Table 12. All regressions include age, age-squared, interview language, the month of birth fixed effects, region fixed effects and childhood region is a village dummy and the interactions of the latter two as controls.<sup>18</sup> First-stage regression shows that the reform increased the years of schooling 0.95 years for all women and 1.16 years for the women who grew up in a village<sup>19</sup>. The results presented in column 3 to 7 shows that the increased years of schooling decreased probability to experience physical violence significantly with a larger decrease in the village subsample. We also repeat the same exercise with 23-26 years-old women and present the results in Table 13. Our results consistently show that the increased years of schooling of women decreased physical violence and sexual violence. The decrease in the physical violence is larger for the women who grew up in a village. There is also evidence that psychological violence decreased for the village women.

These results indicate that being young is not the confounder factor of the effect of the reform on the violence measures presented earlier.

### 7.0.2 Difference-in-Differences Approach

In the previous sections, we showed that the education reform increased women’s years of schooling especially for women who have grown up in a village, which in turn decreases their likelihood of being exposed to domestic violence. We also show that the cohort effect does not drive these results.

In this section, to further check the robustness of our results, we use a difference-in-differences approach to analyze the effect of education on domestic violence incidences. We use those who are between 28-31-year-old as a control group as they are not exposed to the reform in 2008 and 2014 survey year, and those who are between 22-year-old and 27-year-old as a treatment group. Table 11 shows the summary statistics for 28 – 31-year-old women in both 2008 and 2014 survey years in column 4 and 5, and the differences are presented in column 6. On average these two groups have same level of schooling, which is expected as they are not exposed to the education reform. We used 22 to 27 year-old women in both survey years to check the cohort effect in the previous section as they are treated by the reform in 2014 survey year, but not exposed to the reform in 2008 survey year. Table 10 presents exposure to the law according to the year of birth in 2008 and 2014 survey years. One advantage of this approach is it removes the effect of the general trend in the domestic violence probabilities under the assumption that trend is same for both 22 to 27-year-old

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<sup>18</sup>In 2008 data set, mother tongue information is not available, therefore we use the interview language as it is available in both 2008 and 2014 data sets.

<sup>19</sup>F-stat of the first stage is 35.9.

and 28 to 31-year-old women.<sup>20</sup>

We estimate the following difference-in-differences model:

$$y_i = \alpha + X_i\beta + \lambda_1 Young_i + \lambda_2 D_{2014,i} + \lambda_3 Young_i * D_{2014,i} + \varepsilon_i$$

where  $Young_i$  is a dummy variable for whether the respondent is 22 to 27-year-old,  $D_{2014,i}$  is a dummy variable that identifies the survey year 2014, and the  $X_i$  is the individual characteristics such as the month of birth fixed effects, a dummy variable for whether the respondent’s interview language is not Turkish, age, and its square, a dummy variable for whether the respondent’s childhood region is a village, childhood region fixed effects, and the interaction of the latter two variables. The parameter of interest is  $\lambda_3$  which represents the differential impact of being 22 to 27-year-old and being exposed to the reform in 2014 relative to 2008.

Table 10 presents the results regarding the schooling outcomes and the violence outcomes for the last partner. The results suggest that the education reform increased years of schooling for all women and of the women who grew up in a village by 1 year and 1.68 years, respectively. The increase in years of schooling leads to a decrease in physical violence, especially in severe physical violence, psychological and sexual violence for the women who have ever had a relationship. The decrease in physical and psychological violence is more pronounced for the women who grew up in a village. These results are consistent with the findings that are presented in Table 5, A.3 and A.10. Thus, the diff-in-diffs estimates also confirm our findings that are presented in the earlier sections.

## 8 Conclusion

Domestic violence against women is a common problem in many countries across the world. It has important consequences for women involved in violent relationships and for children witness violence at home. It affects the productivity, mental and physical health of women, and the physical and mental development of children witnessing violence. Thus, identifying the factors that can reduce domestic violence has important policy implications.

The only paper on the causal effect of education on domestic violence against women, Erten and Keskin (2018), shows that the education increases the psychological violence and financial control behavior experienced by women raised in rural areas. We revisit this question by using more recent data, 2014 TNRDVW data set, and show that the reform was effective in reducing women’s exposure to domestic violence from an intimate partner.

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<sup>20</sup>Cesur and Mocan (2018) use this approach to identify the effect of education on modernity and on the probability of wearing a head cover in Turkey.

Besides, we used 2008 and 2014 TNRDVW datasets along with alternative methods and confirmed our findings.

We show that the education reform increased the years of schooling for women by around 0.8 year. The effect of the reform had a larger effect on women who grew up in a village by increasing years of schooling by around 1.8 years. On the other hand, we find no evidence of a differential impact of the schooling law on the women whose childhood region is a non-village area.

We show that increased years of schooling for women helped to reduce the domestic violence outcomes. We report a significant decline in sexual violence and physical violence which is mainly driven by a decrease in offensive incidences with severe health damage. The decrease in the latter category is larger for women raised in a village. We also provide evidence that the psychological violence decreased. However, there is no evidence of a change in social control behavior and financial control behavior.

We also examine the causal channels through which education translates into lower levels of domestic violence outcomes. We find that the compulsory schooling law had no causal impact on labor market outcomes, while women's gender attitudes have improved slightly only for the women who have grown up in a village. Our finding points out that the education reform had important effects on marriage market outcomes. Namely, it increased the probability of women making their own marriage decision, the partners' years of schooling and the partners' employment probability, while it decreases the probability of marrying a partner who had experienced violence while being raised. We also show that the education reform had limited effect on men's education level as their primary school completion rate, 5 years of schooling, is already close to 90 percent before the reform. Our findings on the marriage market outcomes suggest that, the better female education enhances women's marital foresight and increases the "quality" of the husband.

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Figure 1: McCrary Density Test




Figure 2: Density Test for Covariates




Figure 3: Treatment Effects on Relationship Status




Figure 4: Completed Years of Schooling




Figure 5: Treatment Effects on Junior High School Completion Rate by Gender




Figure 6: Violence Outcomes: 2008 TNSDVW Survey




Table 1: Summary Statistics for 19-35 Year Old Women by Childhood Region

VARIABLES	Childhood Region			Difference (3) - (2)
	All women	Village	Non-village	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Estimate
	(SD)	(SD)	(SD)	(SE)
	Obs	Obs	Obs	
Years of Schooling	8.271 (4.110) 2,436	6.664 (3.668) 890	9.064 (4.085) 1,544	2.40*** (0.19)
Junior Highschool Completion	0.608 (0.488) 2,304	0.422 (0.494) 813	0.695 (0.460) 1,489	0.27*** (0.02)
Highschool Completion	0.400 (0.490) 2,304	0.234 (0.424) 813	0.479 (0.500) 1,489	0.24*** (0.02)
Primary school Completion	0.958 (0.201) 2,304	0.947 (0.225) 813	0.963 (0.188) 1,489	0.02 (0.01)
College Completion	0.144 (0.352) 2,304	0.070 (0.255) 813	0.179 (0.384) 1,489	0.11*** (0.02)
Domestic Violence indexes				
Physical Violence	-0.025 (0.744) 2,434	0.024 (0.813) 890	-0.049 (0.707) 1,542	-0.07* (0.04)
Severe Physical Violence	0.005 (0.848) 2,434	0.036 (0.938) 890	-0.011 (0.800) 1,542	-0.05 (0.05)
Mild Physical Violence	-0.055 (0.790) 2,433	0.011 (0.845) 889	-0.087 (0.760) 1,542	-0.10** (0.04)
Psychological Violence	0.018 (0.760) 2,434	0.022 (0.748) 890	0.017 (0.766) 1,542	-0.01 (0.04)
Sexual Violence	-0.017 (0.771) 2,434	0.027 (0.822) 890	-0.039 (0.744) 1,542	-0.07* (0.04)
Social Control Behavior	0.062 (0.590) 2,434	0.085 (0.568) 890	0.050 (0.599) 1,542	-0.04 (0.03)
Financial Control Behaviour	-0.014 (0.677) 2,407	-0.005 (0.706) 881	-0.019 (0.662) 1,524	-0.01 (0.03)
Gender Attitudes				
Disagree: a woman should not argue with her husband	0.652 (0.476) 2,412	0.591 (0.492) 876	0.682 (0.466) 1,534	0.09*** (0.02)
Agree: a woman can spend her own money	0.698 (0.459) 2,407	0.664 (0.473) 880	0.714 (0.452) 1,525	0.05** (0.02)
Agree: a man should help with housework	0.729 (0.445) 2,424	0.681 (0.467) 884	0.752 (0.432) 1,538	0.07*** (0.02)
Disagree: children can be beaten, for discipline	0.752 (0.432) 2,423	0.686 (0.464) 886	0.784 (0.412) 1,535	0.10*** (0.02)
Disagree: men are responsible for women's actions	0.634 (0.482) 2,388	0.561 (0.497) 871	0.670 (0.470) 1,515	0.11*** (0.02)

Continued on next page

Table 1 – continued from previous page

VARIABLES	Childhood Region			Difference (3) - (2) Estimate (SE)
	All women	Village	Non-village	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Mean (SD) Obs	Mean (SD) Obs	Mean (SD) Obs	
Disagree: a man can use violence in certain situations	0.646 (0.478) 2,311	0.592 (0.492) 841	0.673 (0.469) 1,468	0.08*** (0.02)
Disagree: a woman cannot refuse to have sex with husband	0.982 (0.134) 2,422	0.973 (0.161) 882	0.986 (0.119) 1,538	0.01* (0.01)
Gender attitudes index	0.044 (0.499) 2,436	-0.068 (0.508) 890	0.098 (0.485) 1,544	0.17*** (0.02)
Labor Market Outcomes				
Employed	0.281 (0.450) 2,272	0.244 (0.430) 816	0.299 (0.458) 1,454	0.05** (0.02)
Employed in agriculture	0.026 (0.158) 2,436	0.040 (0.197) 890	0.018 (0.134) 1,544	-0.02*** (0.01)
Employed in service	0.205 (0.404) 2,436	0.145 (0.352) 890	0.234 (0.424) 1,544	0.09*** (0.02)
Social security	0.191 (0.393) 2,436	0.134 (0.340) 890	0.220 (0.414) 1,544	0.09*** (0.02)
Ownership index	-0.058 (0.471) 2,436	-0.084 (0.429) 890	-0.046 (0.491) 1,544	0.04* (0.02)
Marriage Outcomes				
Marriage age	20.649 (3.690) 2,173	20.202 (3.556) 828	20.886 (3.740) 1,344	0.68*** (0.19)
Marriage decision	0.590 (0.492) 2,176	0.484 (0.500) 830	0.646 (0.478) 1,345	0.16*** (0.03)
Partner employed	0.920 (0.271) 2,429	0.914 (0.281) 887	0.923 (0.267) 1,540	0.01 (0.01)
Partner schooling	9.422 (3.812) 2,417	8.385 (3.516) 883	9.934 (3.849) 1,532	1.55*** (0.18)
Schooling difference	1.139 (3.527) 2,417	1.726 (3.561) 883	0.850 (3.475) 1,532	-0.88*** (0.17)
Partner's college completion rate	0.263 (0.440) 2,436	0.161 (0.368) 890	0.314 (0.464) 1,544	0.15*** (0.02)
Partner's high school completion rate	0.571 (0.495) 2,436	0.474 (0.500) 890	0.620 (0.486) 1,544	0.15*** (0.02)
Age difference	4.433 (4.307) 2,170	4.351 (4.573) 825	4.476 (4.161) 1,344	0.13 (0.22)
Partner's age	33.932 (5.554) 2,170	34.187 (5.869) 825	33.800 (5.375) 1,344	-0.39 (0.29)
Partner's addictive behavior index	0.013 (0.771)	0.072 (0.721)	-0.016 (0.793)	-0.09** (0.04)

Continued on next page

Table 1 – continued from previous page

VARIABLES	Childhood Region			Difference (3) - (2)
	All women	Village	Non-village	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Estimate
	(SD)	(SD)	(SD)	(SE)
	Obs	Obs	Obs	
Partner's mother faced violence	2,432 0.905 (0.293) 526	889 0.900 (0.300) 182	1,541 0.907 (0.291) 344	0.01 (0.03)
Partner experienced violence	2,432 0.278 (0.448) 1,980	889 0.275 (0.447) 720	1,541 0.280 (0.449) 1,259	0.00 (0.02)
Divorced	2,432 0.064 (0.245) 2,176	889 0.054 (0.225) 830	1,541 0.070 (0.255) 1,345	0.02 (0.01)
Remarried	2,432 0.029 (0.169) 2,436	889 0.030 (0.170) 890	1,541 0.029 (0.168) 1,544	0.00 (0.01)
Household asset ownership index	2,432 0.020 (0.651) 2,436	889 0.017 (1.057) 890	1,541 0.021 (0.286) 1,544	0.00 (0.04)
Covariates				
Mother tongue: non-Turkish	2,432 0.165 (0.372) 2,435	889 0.205 (0.404) 890	1,541 0.146 (0.353) 1,543	-0.06*** (0.02)
Childhood region: Village	2,432 0.349 (0.477) 2,400	889 1.000 (0.000) 890	1,541 0.000 (0.000) 1,544	1.000*** (0.000)
Childhood region: North	2,432 0.172 (0.377) 2,436	889 0.263 (0.440) 890	1,541 0.127 (0.333) 1,544	-0.14*** (0.02)
Childhood region: West	2,432 0.413 (0.492) 2,436	889 0.269 (0.444) 890	1,541 0.484 (0.500) 1,544	0.21*** (0.02)
Childhood region: South	2,432 0.086 (0.280) 2,436	889 0.093 (0.291) 890	1,541 0.082 (0.275) 1,544	-0.01 (0.01)
Childhood region: Central	2,432 0.166 (0.372) 2,436	889 0.164 (0.371) 890	1,541 0.167 (0.373) 1,544	0.00 (0.02)
Childhood region: East	2,432 0.164 (0.370) 2,436	889 0.211 (0.408) 890	1,541 0.140 (0.347) 1,544	-0.07*** (0.02)

Table 2: RD Estimates for Covariates

VARIABLES	(1) Linear RD	(2) Mean	(3) Bandwidth	(4) Observations
Childhood Region: North	-0.038 (-1.431)	0.17	142	3,797
Childhood Region: West	0.023 (0.569)	0.42	120	3,274
Childhood Region: South	-0.006 (-0.290)	0.08	120	3,274
Childhood Region: Central	0.005 (0.174)	0.17	131	3,537
Childhood Region: East	0.025 (0.898)	0.15	127	3,445
Childhood Region: Rural	0.041 (0.929)	0.34	90	2,442
Non-Turkish Speaker	0.043 (1.545)	0.17	114	3,113
Ever Married	0.011 (0.336)	0.85	82	2,274
Ever Had a Relationship	0.012 (0.538)	0.94	74	2,016

*Note:* Data are from 2014 TNRDVW. Column (1) lists linear RD point estimates, columns (2)-(3) list means, optimal IK bandwidths and observations included in each regression, respectively. January 1987 is chosen as cutoff. All specifications include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate the significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively.

Table 3: Treatment Effects on Schooling

VARIABLES	(1) Linear RD $\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(2) Quadratic RD $\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(3) Linear RD $\hat{h}/2$ bandwidth	(4) Linear RD $2\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(5) BW	(6) Obs.	(7) Mean
<hr/> SAMPLE OF ALL WOMEN <hr/>							
Years of schooling	0.793** (0.348)+++	0.691 (0.507)	0.495 (0.492)	0.905*** (0.265)+++	95	2,604	8.42
Junior high school	0.211*** (0.035)+++	0.175*** (0.052)+++	0.173*** (0.049)+++	0.204*** (0.027)+++	111	2,886	0.63
High school	0.111** (0.049)++	0.083 (0.071)	0.109* (0.064)	0.211*** (0.039)+++	72	1,864	0.42
College	0.031 (0.027)	0.018 (0.039)	0.013 (0.036)	0.015 (0.021)	112	2,907	0.14
<hr/> SAMPLE OF WOMEN WHO HAVE HAD A RELATIONSHIP <hr/>							
Years of schooling	0.825** (0.349)++	0.626 (0.512)	0.553 (0.476)	0.742*** (0.270)+++	98	2,451	8.28
Junior high school	0.214*** (0.038)+++	0.185*** (0.056)+++	0.174*** (0.054)+++	0.205*** (0.029)+++	106	2,484	0.61
High school	0.111** (0.048)++	0.119* (0.066)	0.059 (0.061)	0.140*** (0.038)+++	85	2,027	0.40
College	0.014 (0.027)	-0.004 (0.040)	0.013 (0.035)	-0.009 (0.022)	118	2,731	0.14

*Note:* Columns (1)-(4) list RD point estimates for different bandwidths. Columns (5)-(7) report optimal IK bandwidths, number of observations and sample means, respectively. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table 4: Treatment Effects on Schooling by Childhood Region

VARIABLES	(1) Linear RD $\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(2) Quadratic RD $\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(3) Linear RD $\hat{h}/2$ bandwidth	(4) Linear RD $2\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(5) BW	(6) Obs.	(7) Mean
GREW UP IN VILLAGE							
Years of Schooling	1.842*** (0.559)+++	1.036 (0.805)	0.992 (0.864)	1.427*** (0.447)+++	88	816	6.69
Junior high school	0.400*** (0.071)+++	0.290** (0.112)++	0.251** (0.115)	0.361*** (0.058)+++	95	802	0.43
High school	0.233*** (0.073)+++	0.212** (0.104)	0.074 (0.103)	0.245*** (0.059)+++	91	773	0.23
College	0.108*** (0.041)+++	0.072 (0.062)	0.042 (0.060)	0.080** (0.034)++	101	841	0.07
GREW UP IN NON-VILLAGE							
Years of Schooling	0.426 (0.374)	0.384 (0.541)	0.315 (0.466)	0.298 (0.301)	105	1648	9.08
Junior high school	0.149*** (0.040)+++	0.122** (0.059)	0.116** (0.056)	0.130*** (0.033)+++	108	1,640	0.70
High school	0.036 (0.056)	0.115 (0.076)	0.083 (0.069)	0.076* (0.046)	90	1,397	0.48
College	-0.041 (0.035)	-0.003 (0.051)	-0.004 (0.045)	-0.047* (0.028)	111	1,673	0.17

*Note:* Columns (1)-(4) list RD point estimates for different bandwidths. Columns (5)-(7) report optimal IK bandwidths, number of observations and sample means, respectively. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table 5: Violence Outcomes from Last Partner by Childhood Region

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Physical Violence	-0.027*** (0.004)+++	-0.179*** (0.060)+	-0.225** (0.110)	-0.016** (0.008)+	-0.136* (0.077)	-0.097* (0.059)
Mean	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.05	0.05	0.05
Bandwidth	108	108	108	200	200	200
Observations	2,677	2,677	2,677	1,525	1,525	1,525
Severe Physical Violence	-0.019*** (0.005)+++	-0.193*** (0.066)+	-0.254* (0.132)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.327*** (0.088)+++	-0.227*** (0.087)
Mean	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
Bandwidth	111	111	111	172	172	172
Observations	2,726	2,726	2,726	1,364	1,364	1,364
Mild Physical Violence	-0.035*** (0.005)+++	-0.171** (0.066)+	-0.216** (0.110)	-0.021** (0.010)+	-0.016 (0.096)	-0.011 (0.067)
Mean	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	0.04	0.04	0.04
Bandwidth	108	108	108	181	181	181
Observations	2,676	2,676	2,676	1,427	1,427	1,427
Psychological Violence	-0.018*** (0.005)+++	-0.114 (0.070)	-0.147 (0.095)	0.004 (0.010)	-0.170* (0.099)	-0.105* (0.063)
Mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Bandwidth	116	116	116	129	129	129
Observations	2,830	2,830	2,830	1,105	1,105	1,105
Sexual Violence	-0.020*** (0.004)+++	-0.132** (0.066)	-0.187* (0.109)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.225* (0.114)	-0.132* (0.078)
Mean	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Bandwidth	113	113	113	103	103	103
Observations	2,762	2,762	2,762	933	933	933
Social Control Behaviour	-0.022*** (0.004)+++	-0.079 (0.050)	-0.089 (0.057)	-0.018** (0.008)++	-0.036 (0.090)	-0.020 (0.048)
Mean	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.08
Bandwidth	132	132	132	92	92	92
Observations	3,133	3,133	3,133	853	853	853
Financial Control Behaviour	-0.026*** (0.004)+++	-0.038 (0.063)	-0.049 (0.078)	-0.020** (0.009)++	-0.053 (0.114)	-0.033 (0.068)
Mean	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bandwidth	106	106	106	102	102	102
Observations	2,589	2,589	2,589	915	915	915

*Note:* Columns (1)-(3) list OLS estimates, sharp RD and fuzzy RD point estimates, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) report the above mentioned estimates for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Sample means, optimal IK bandwidths and number of observations are reported below. All regressions include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table 6: Violence Outcomes from Any Partner by Childhood Region

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Physical Violence	-0.023*** (0.006)+++	-0.148** (0.062)	-0.183* (0.106)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.194** (0.080)	-0.121** (0.060)
Mean	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01
Bandwidth	88	88	88	155	155	155
Observations	2,235	2,235	2,235	1,266	1,266	1,266
Severe Physical Violence	-0.016*** (0.006)+++	-0.114 (0.071)	-0.142 (0.105)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.321*** (0.084)+++	-0.225** (0.092)
Mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
Bandwidth	96	96	96	162	162	162
Observations	2,419	2,419	2,419	1,306	1,306	1,306
Mild Physical Violence	-0.031*** (0.006)+++	-0.125* (0.064)	-0.152 (0.093)	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.058 (0.095)	-0.034 (0.056)
Mean	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02
Bandwidth	98	98	98	147	147	147
Observations	2,449	2,449	2,449	1,219	1,219	1,219
Psychological Violence	-0.015*** (0.005)+++	-0.063 (0.062)	-0.070 (0.066)	0.005 (0.010)	-0.152 (0.092)	-0.096 (0.060)
Mean	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
Bandwidth	152	152	152	130	130	130
Observations	3,420	3,420	3,420	1,111	1,111	1,111
Sexual Violence	-0.019*** (0.004)+++	-0.104 (0.063)	-0.120 (0.074)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.192* (0.101)	-0.119* (0.070)
Mean	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01
Bandwidth	128	128	128	129	129	129
Observations	3,048	3,048	3,048	1,105	1,105	1,105
Financial Control Behaviour	-0.022*** (0.004)+++	-0.038 (0.062)	-0.050 (0.078)	-0.021** (0.009)+++	-0.101 (0.114)	-0.053 (0.057)
Mean	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
Bandwidth	99	99	99	83	83	83
Observations	2,446	2,446	2,446	765	765	765

*Note:* Columns (1)-(3) list OLS estimates, sharp RD and fuzzy RD point estimates, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) report the above mentioned estimates for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Sample means, optimal IK bandwidths and number of observations are reported below. All regressions include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table 7: Education Effects on Gender Attitudes by Childhood Region

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Disagree: a woman should not argue with her husband	0.035*** (0.003)+++	0.032 (0.049)	0.046 (0.066)	0.041*** (0.005)+++	0.076 (0.076)	0.047 (0.044)
Mean	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.59	0.59	0.59
Bandwidth	95	95	95	105	105	105
Observations	2,369	2,369	2,369	939	939	939
Agree: a woman can spend her own money	0.018*** (0.003)+++	-0.039 (0.037)	-0.045 (0.050)	0.015** (0.006)++	-0.088 (0.090)	-0.052 (0.058)
Mean	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.67	0.67	0.67
Bandwidth	118	118	118	73	73	73
Observations	2,840	2,840	2,840	664	664	664
Agree: men should also do housework	0.025*** (0.002)+++	-0.048 (0.030)	-0.067 (0.054)	0.018*** (0.005)+++	-0.004 (0.073)	-0.003 (0.044)
Mean	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.68	0.68	0.68
Bandwidth	209	209	209	102	102	102
Observations	4,093	4,093	4,093	919	919	919
Disagree: children can be beaten	0.018*** (0.003)+++	-0.003 (0.034)	-0.004 (0.043)	0.020*** (0.006)+++	0.040 (0.073)	0.022 (0.040)
Mean	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.69	0.69	0.69
Bandwidth	103	103	103	92	92	92
Observations	2,538	2,538	2,538	849	849	849
Disagree: men are responsible for women's actions	0.031*** (0.003)+++	-0.023 (0.038)	-0.037 (0.070)	0.032*** (0.006)+++	-0.030 (0.064)	-0.024 (0.051)
Mean	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.56	0.56	0.56
Bandwidth	113	113	113	112	112	112
Observations	2,711	2,711	2,711	983	983	983
Disagree: men can use violence in certain situations	0.025*** (0.003)+++	0.006 (0.047)	0.007 (0.048)	0.023*** (0.005)+++	0.037 (0.078)	0.022 (0.047)
Mean	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.58	0.58	0.58
Bandwidth	94	94	94	127	127	127
Observations	2,252	2,252	2,252	1,032	1,032	1,032
Disagree: women cannot refuse having sex if husband wants	0.002** (0.001)++	0.011 (0.012)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.043* (0.022)	0.027* (0.016)
Mean	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98
Bandwidth	101	101	101	115	115	115
Observations	2,504	2,504	2,504	1,013	1,013	1,013
Gender attitudes index	0.048*** (0.003)+++	-0.025 (0.039)	-0.032 (0.058)	0.042*** (0.006)+++	0.082 (0.079)	0.043 (0.039)
Mean	0.05	0.05	0.05	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07
Bandwidth	110	110	110	87	87	87
Observations	2,714	2,714	2,714	809	809	809

*Note:* Columns (1)-(3) list OLS estimates, sharp RD and fuzzy RD point estimates, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) report the above mentioned estimates for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Sample means, optimal IK bandwidths and number of observations are reported below. All regressions include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table 8: Education Effects on Marriage Outcomes by Childhood Region

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Marriage age	0.395*** (0.030)+++	0.356 (0.475)	0.607 (0.860)	0.349*** (0.039)+++	0.625 (0.485)	0.459 (0.354)
Mean	20.37	20.37	20.37	20.21	20.21	20.21
Bandwidth	37	37	37	92	92	92
Observations	913	913	913	793	793	793
Marriage decision	0.040*** (0.004)+++	0.142*** (0.050)+	0.205 (0.125)	0.042*** (0.006)+++	0.259*** (0.064)+++	0.203** (0.084)
Mean	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.48	0.48	0.48
Bandwidth	61	61	61	101	101	101
Observations	1,432	1,432	1,432	843	843	843
Partner employed	-0.000 (0.002)	0.092*** (0.028)++	0.103** (0.047)	0.007** (0.003)+	0.075* (0.044)	0.045* (0.027)
Mean	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.91	0.91
Bandwidth	85	85	85	108	108	108
Observations	2,167	2,167	2,167	979	979	979
Partner schooling	0.564*** (0.022)+++	0.714** (0.322)	0.976** (0.434)	0.463*** (0.041)+++	1.731*** (0.525)++	1.004*** (0.308)++
Mean	9.43	9.43	9.43	8.41	8.41	8.41
Bandwidth	94	94	94	92	92	92
Observations	2,357	2,357	2,357	847	847	847
Schooling difference	-0.411*** (0.018)+++	-0.117 (0.278)	-0.131 (0.286)	-0.525*** (0.037)+++	0.039 (0.480)	0.026 (0.313)
Mean	1.15	1.15	1.15	1.73	1.73	1.73
Bandwidth	149	149	149	121	121	121
Observations	3,345	3,345	3,345	1,056	1,056	1,056
Partner's college completion rate	0.053*** (0.003)+++	-0.053 (0.040)	-0.055 (0.054)	0.039*** (0.005)+++	0.037 (0.059)	0.018 (0.027)
Mean	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.16	0.16	0.16
Bandwidth	80	80	80	85	85	85
Observations	2,043	2,043	2,043	791	791	791
Partner's high school completion rate	0.054*** (0.003)+++	0.046 (0.041)	0.058 (0.049)	0.048*** (0.005)+++	0.148* (0.078)	0.082* (0.043)
Mean	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.47	0.47	0.47
Bandwidth	104	104	104	97	97	97
Observations	2,576	2,576	2,576	890	890	890
Age difference	-0.090 (0.060)	-0.158 (0.564)	-0.447 (1.625)	-0.108* (0.056)+	-0.487 (0.818)	-0.364 (0.587)
Mean	4.72	4.72	4.72	4.40	4.40	4.40
Bandwidth	43	43	43	106	106	106
Observations	1,029	1,029	1,029	892	892	892
Partner's age	-0.092 (0.060)	-0.157 (0.563)	-0.428 (1.560)	-0.108* (0.056)+	-0.535 (0.816)	-0.401 (0.587)
Mean	32.55	32.55	32.55	34.65	34.65	34.65
Bandwidth	44	44	44	107	107	107
Observations	1,046	1,046	1,046	898	898	898
Partner's addictive behavior index	-0.012** (0.006)	0.021 (0.077)	0.028 (0.106)	-0.022** (0.010)	-0.059 (0.096)	-0.034 (0.054)
Mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.07	0.07
Bandwidth	95	95	95	103	103	103
Observations	2,390	2,390	2,390	932	932	932
Partner experienced violence	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.108** (0.042)+	-0.200 (0.145)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.059 (0.064)	-0.038 (0.041)
Mean	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.29
Bandwidth	97	97	97	153	153	153

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Table 8 – continued from previous page

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Observations	1,978	1,978	1,978	1,003	1,003	1,003
Divorced	0.000 (0.002)	-0.027 (0.022)	-0.037 (0.036)	0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.027)	0.001 (0.022)
Mean	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06
Bandwidth	62	62	62	116	116	116
Observations	1,450	1,450	1,450	954	954	954
Remarried	-0.003*** (0.001)+++	-0.009 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.004** (0.002)+	-0.008 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.015)
Mean	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Bandwidth	138	138	138	109	109	109
Observations	3,213	3,213	3,213	985	985	985
Household asset ownership index	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.013 (0.039)	-0.014 (0.042)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.120)	-0.000 (0.071)
Mean	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Bandwidth	84	84	84	70	70	70
Observations	2,155	2,155	2,155	640	640	640

*Note:* Columns (1)-(3) list OLS estimates, sharp RD and fuzzy RD point estimates, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) report the above mentioned estimates for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Sample means, optimal IK bandwidths and number of observations are reported below. All regressions include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table 9: Education Effects on Labor Market Outcomes by Childhood Region

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Employed	0.034*** (0.003)+++	0.001 (0.037)	0.001 (0.046)	0.019*** (0.005)+++	-0.017 (0.056)	-0.010 (0.032)
Mean	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.24	0.24	0.24
Bandwidth	96	96	96	92	92	92
Observations	2,260	2,260	2,260	781	781	781
Employed in agriculture	-0.004*** (0.001)+++	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.004*** (0.002)++	-0.007 (0.023)	-0.004 (0.013)
Mean	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05
Bandwidth	136	136	136	149	149	149
Observations	3,185	3,185	3,185	1,222	1,222	1,222
Employed in service	0.039*** (0.003)+++	-0.001 (0.033)	-0.002 (0.041)	0.027*** (0.004)+++	0.015 (0.047)	0.009 (0.026)
Mean	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.14	0.14	0.14
Bandwidth	108	108	108	96	96	96
Observations	2,679	2,679	2,679	886	886	886
Social security	0.041*** (0.003)+++	0.032 (0.032)	0.039 (0.035)	0.030*** (0.004)+++	0.039 (0.039)	0.023 (0.023)
Mean	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.14	0.14	0.14
Bandwidth	97	97	97	109	109	109
Observations	2,433	2,433	2,433	985	985	985
Ownership index	0.025*** (0.004)+++	-0.051 (0.042)	-0.061 (0.062)	0.025*** (0.005)+++	-0.036 (0.060)	-0.021 (0.036)
Mean	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.08	-0.08	-0.08
Bandwidth	98	98	98	105	105	105
Observations	2,451	2,451	2,451	954	954	954

*Note:* Columns (1)-(3) list OLS estimates, sharp RD and fuzzy RD point estimates, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) report the above mentioned estimates for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Sample means, optimal IK bandwidths and number of observations are reported below. All regressions include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table 10: Exposure to the Law in the 2014 and 2008 Survey Years

Year	Exposure to the Law	Age in 2008	Age in 2014
1992	Yes	16	22
1991	Yes	17	23
1990	Yes	18	24
1989	Yes	19	25
1988	Yes	20	26
1987	Yes	21	27
1986	No	22	28
1985	No	23	29
1984	No	24	30
1983	No	25	31
1982	No	26	32
1981	No	27	33
1980	No	28	34
1979	No	29	35
1978	No	30	36
1977	No	31	37

Table 11: Summary Statistics: 22-27 and 28-31 Year Old Women in 2008 and 2014

VARIABLES	Young (22-27 years-old)			Old (28-31 year-old)		
	2008 (1) Mean (SD) Observation	2014 (2) Mean (SD) Observation	Difference (2)-(1) (3) Estimate (SE)	2008 (4) Mean (SD) Observation	2014 (5) Mean (SD) Observation	Difference (5)-(4) (6) Estimate (SE)
Years of Schooling	7.857 (3.611) 2260	8.915 (3.861) 2260	1.058*** (0.201)	7.699 (3.643) 1959	7.774 (4.260) 1959	0.075 (0.230)
Childhood Region: Village	0.338 (0.473) 2347	0.303 (0.460) 2347	-0.035 (0.024)	0.356 (0.479) 2063	0.338 (0.473) 2063	-0.018 (0.026)
Interview Language Dummy	0.005 (0.072) 2343	0.008 (0.087) 2343	0.003 (0.004)	0.011 (0.106) 2060	0.007 (0.083) 2060	-0.004 (0.004)
Childhood Region: North	0.166 (0.372) 2349	0.144 (0.351) 2349	-0.022 (0.019)	0.175 (0.380) 2063	0.187 (0.390) 2063	0.012 (0.022)
Childhood Region: West	0.328 (0.470) 2349	0.430 (0.495) 2349	0.102*** (0.027)	0.324 (0.468) 2063	0.365 (0.482) 2063	0.041 (0.028)
Childhood Region: South	0.102 (0.303) 2349	0.073 (0.260) 2349	-0.029** (0.014)	0.127 (0.333) 2063	0.095 (0.293) 2063	-0.032* (0.017)
Childhood Region: Central	0.195 (0.396) 2349	0.175 (0.381) 2349	-0.019 (0.019)	0.163 (0.369) 2063	0.178 (0.383) 2063	0.015 (0.020)
Childhood Region: East	0.209 (0.407) 2349	0.178 (0.383) 2349	-0.031 (0.020)	0.211 (0.408) 2063	0.175 (0.380) 2063	-0.036* (0.021)

*Note:* Data are from the 2008 and 2014 TNSDVW. The table presents means, standard deviations and the number of observations. Young refers to the women who are 22 to 27-year-old. Youngs in 2014 sample are exposed to the reform, while Youngs in 2008 sample are not affected by the change in the law. 28-31 year-old women in both survey years are not affected from the reform. Columns 1,2 and 4,5 present means and standard deviations in parentheses. Columns 3 and 6 present the differences in group means between 2014 and 2008 for Young and Old, respectively. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate the significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively.

Table 12: Instrumental Variables Regressions Using 22-27 Year-old Women in 2008 and 2014 Sample

VARIABLES	Years of Schooling	Junior High school	Physical Violence	Severe Physical Violence	Mild Physical Violence	Psychological Violence	Sexual Violence	Social Control Behavior	Financial Control Behavior
ALL WOMEN									
Age	0.072 (1.329)	-0.202 (0.177)	-0.113 (0.238)	-0.058 (0.278)	-0.175 (0.256)	0.491 (0.351)	0.077 (0.274)	0.426** (0.206)	-0.287 (0.311)
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.004 (0.027)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.009** (0.004)	0.006 (0.006)
Non-Turkish Speaker	-2.993** (1.496)	-0.417*** (0.147)	-0.297* (0.171)	-0.262 (0.235)	-0.331** (0.140)	-0.384* (0.209)	-0.329** (0.130)	0.186 (0.138)	-0.374*** (0.122)
Treatment Dummy	0.955*** (0.159)+++	0.292*** (0.019)+++	-0.075** (0.031)+	-0.076** (0.033)+	-0.075** (0.034)+	-0.059 (0.039)	-0.051* (0.029)	0.014 (0.028)	-0.009 (0.032)
Observations	2,252	2,212	2,250	2,250	2,250	2,250	2,250	2,249	2,186
Childhood Region FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Village Control	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Village*Childhood Region FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Birth of Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
VILLAGE									
Age	1.371 (2.466)	-0.041 (0.345)	0.102 (0.464)	0.566 (0.609)	-0.383 (0.419)	0.491 (0.618)	0.065 (0.437)	0.110 (0.321)	-0.297 (0.511)
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.030 (0.050)	0.000 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.012)	0.008 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.006 (0.010)
Non-Turkish Speaker	0.979 (1.373)	0.047 (0.125)	0.220 (0.480)	0.476 (0.679)	-0.036 (0.287)	0.159 (0.128)	-0.185** (0.092)	0.115 (0.134)	-0.177 (0.229)
Treatment Dummy	1.164*** (0.300)+++	0.398*** (0.039)+++	-0.137*** (0.051)++	-0.184*** (0.061)++	-0.090* (0.053)	-0.182*** (0.063)++	-0.056 (0.041)	0.005 (0.035)	-0.115** (0.047)++
Observations	770	744	770	770	770	770	770	770	750
Childhood Region FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Birth of Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Note: Data are from 2014 TNSDVW and 2008 TNSDVW. Young refers to the women who are 22 to 27-year-old. Youngs in 2014 sample are exposed to the reform, while Youngs in 2008 sample are not affected by the change in the law. 28-31 year-old women in both survey years are not affected by the reform. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, region fixed effects and childhood region is a village dummy and their interactions as controls. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the month-year cohort level. Results are robust to clustering at the region-age level as well. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate the significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table 13: Instrumental Variables Regressions Using 23-26 Year-old Women in 2008 and 2014 Sample

VARIABLES	Years of Schooling	Junior High school	Physical Violence	Severe Physical Violence	Mild Physical Violence	Psychological Violence	Sexual Violence	Social Control Behavior	Financial Control Behavior
ALL WOMEN									
Age	-2.968 (3.805)	-0.502 (0.493)	-1.134 (0.747)	-1.262 (0.877)	-1.005 (0.792)	0.710 (1.011)	0.605 (0.763)	0.480 (0.692)	-0.151 (0.901)
Age <sup>2</sup>	0.058 (0.078)	0.010 (0.010)	0.024 (0.015)	0.026 (0.018)	0.021 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.014)	0.003 (0.018)
Non-Turkish Speaker	-3.695** (1.581)	-0.480*** (0.164)	-0.330*** (0.113)	-0.372*** (0.140)	-0.288** (0.133)	-0.322 (0.213)	-0.293** (0.133)	0.118 (0.141)	-0.315** (0.132)
Treatment Dummy	1.244*** (0.179)+++	0.332*** (0.023)+++	-0.049* (0.028)	-0.051* (0.031)	-0.046 (0.031)	-0.038 (0.037)	-0.033 (0.026)	0.002 (0.028)	-0.012 (0.030)
Observations	1,518	1,493	1,516	1,516	1,516	1,516	1,516	1,515	1,484
Childhood Region FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Village Control	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Village*Childhood Region FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Birth of Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
VILLAGE									
Age	-2.414 (7.588)	-1.284 (1.162)	-1.837 (1.521)	-1.609 (1.944)	-2.066 (1.442)	-0.639 (1.880)	1.421 (1.098)	-1.276 (0.988)	-1.940 (1.331)
Age <sup>2</sup>	0.046 (0.154)	0.026 (0.024)	0.038 (0.031)	0.033 (0.040)	0.043 (0.029)	0.014 (0.038)	-0.028 (0.022)	0.026 (0.020)	0.040 (0.027)
Non-Turkish Speaker	-0.644 (0.932)	-0.074 (0.113)	-0.552*** (0.208)	-0.608** (0.264)	-0.496*** (0.178)	0.274 (0.229)	-0.118 (0.109)	-0.065 (0.128)	-0.365** (0.178)
Treatment Dummy	1.572*** (0.380)+++	0.456*** (0.050)+++	-0.119** (0.048)++	-0.162*** (0.057)++	-0.076 (0.051)	-0.137** (0.055)++	-0.063* (0.034)+	-0.026 (0.032)	-0.123*** (0.040)++
Observations	503	487	503	503	503	503	503	503	493
Childhood Region FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Birth of Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Note: Data are from 2014 TNSDVW and 2008 TNSDVW. Young refers to the women who are 22 to 27-year-old. Youngs in 2014 sample are exposed to the reform, while Youngs in 2008 sample are not affected by the change in the law. 28-31 year-old women in both survey years are not affected by the reform. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, region fixed effects and childhood region is a village dummy and their interactions as controls. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the month-year cohort level. Results are robust to clustering at the region-age level as well. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate the significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table 14: Difference in Differences Analysis Estimation Results

VARIABLES	Years of Schooling	Junior High school	Physical Violence	Severe Physical Violence	Mild Physical Violence	Psychological Violence	Sexual Violence	Social Control Behavior	Financial Control Behavior
<b>ALL WOMEN</b>									
Age	0.116 (0.438)	-0.006 (0.051)	0.215** (0.087)	0.181* (0.099)	0.242*** (0.092)	0.228** (0.095)	0.152 (0.097)	0.007 (0.061)	0.201* (0.109)
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.004* (0.002)
Non-Turkish Speaker	-2.946*** (0.846)	-0.321*** (0.088)	0.073 (0.114)	0.057 (0.128)	0.090 (0.116)	-0.003 (0.115)	0.128 (0.142)	0.054 (0.063)	-0.272*** (0.103)
Year 2014	-0.044 (0.178)	0.053** 1 (0.022)	0.045 (0.039)	0.064 (0.042)	0.027 (0.042)	0.048 (0.037)	0.098** (0.041)	0.082*** (0.031)	0.001 (0.041)
Young	-0.372 (0.254)	-0.061* (0.031)	-0.060 (0.045)	-0.043 (0.048)	-0.074 (0.051)	-0.033 (0.051)	0.008 (0.048)	-0.000 (0.036)	-0.105* (0.059)
Young*Year 2014	1.011*** (0.228)+++	0.241*** (0.029)+++	-0.114** (0.047)++	-0.134*** (0.051)++	-0.094* (0.051)+	-0.097* (0.053)+	-0.149*** (0.049)+++	-0.055 (0.040)	-0.021 (0.051)
Observations	4,208	4,127	4,397	4,396	4,397	4,397	4,395	4,395	4,312
Childhood Region FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Village Control	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Village*Childhood Region FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Birth of Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
<b>VILLAGE</b>									
Age	-0.235 (0.595)	-0.037 (0.082)	0.078 (0.144)	0.060 (0.130)	0.091 (0.125)	0.054 (0.150)	0.204 (0.146)	0.042 (0.080)	0.091 (0.172)
Age <sup>2</sup>	0.003 (0.011)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
Non-Turkish Speaker	-0.245 (0.775)	-0.044 (0.061)	-0.044 (0.138)	-0.118 (0.109)	0.030 (0.181)	-0.090 (0.192)	0.032 (0.166)	-0.084 (0.059)	-0.416*** (0.087)
Year 2014	-0.451** (0.224)	0.051 (0.034)	0.056 (0.069)	0.076 (0.078)	0.033 (0.065)	-0.008 (0.068)	0.057 (0.067)	0.065 (0.045)	-0.027 (0.075)
Young	-0.057 (0.324)	-0.002 (0.051)	-0.017 (0.080)	0.053 (0.070)	-0.087 (0.065)	0.084 (0.095)	-0.026 (0.079)	-0.029 (0.048)	-0.052 (0.105)
Young*Year 2014	1.683*** (0.360)+++	0.359*** (0.051)+++	-0.194** (0.082)++	-0.266*** (0.085)++	-0.121 (0.081)	-0.185** (0.086)++	-0.114 (0.080)	-0.068 (0.059)	-0.091 (0.092)
Observations	1,467	1,420	1,576	1,576	1,576	1,576	1,576	1,575	1,552
Childhood Region FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Birth of Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

*Note:* Data are from 2014 TNSDVW and 2008 TNSDVW. Young refers to the women who are 22 to 27-year-old. Youngs in 2014 sample are exposed to the reform, while Youngs in 2008 sample are not affected by the change in the law. 28-31 year-old women in both survey years are not affected by the reform. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, region fixed effects and childhood region is a village dummy and their interactions as controls. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the month-year cohort level. Results are robust to clustering at the region-age level as well. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate the significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

# A Appendix

List of variables:

- Years of Schooling - Number of school years the respondent completed
- Junior High school Completion - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent completed at least 8 years of schooling, and 0 otherwise.
- High School Completion - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent completed at least 12 years of schooling, and 0 otherwise.
- College Completion - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent completed at least 16 years of schooling, and 0 otherwise.
- Physical Violence Index - A z-score constructed by averaging z-scores of dummy variables equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have experienced an act of violence from the last (any) intimate partner of the following categories: (i) slapping; (ii) pushing, shoving, or pulling hair; (iii) hitting with punch; (iv) kicking, dragging, or beating; (v) choking, or burning; (vi) threatening with a knife or a weapon.
- Severe Physical Violence Index - A z-score constructed by averaging z-scores of dummy variables equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have experienced an act of violence from the last (any) intimate partner of the following categories: (i) kicking, dragging, or beating; (ii) choking, or burning; (iii) threatening with a knife or a weapon.
- Mild Physical Violence Index - A z-score constructed by averaging z-scores of dummy variables equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have experienced an act of violence from the last (any) intimate partner of the following categories: (i) slapping; (ii) pushing, shoving, or pulling hair; (iii) hitting with punch.
- Psychological Violence Index - A z-score constructed by averaging z-scores of dummy variables equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have experienced an act of violence from the last (any) intimate partner of the following categories: (i) insulting; (ii) belittling, or humiliating; (iii) scaring, or intimidating on purpose; (iv) threatening to hurt.
- Sexual Violence Index - A z-score constructed by averaging z-scores of dummy variables equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have experienced an act of violence from the last (any) intimate partner of the following categories: (i) forcing sexual intercourse; (ii) forcing intercourse through fear; (iii) forcing to do humiliating sexual acts.

- Social Control Behavior Index - A z-score constructed by averaging z-scores of dummy variables equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have experienced an act of violence from the last intimate partner of the following categories: (i) preventing contact with her friends; (ii) preventing contact with her family; (iii) insisting on knowing where she is; (iv) getting angry at her for speaking to other men; (v) getting suspicious of her being unfaithful; (vi) requiring permission for seeking health care; (vii) intervening in her clothing; (viii) intervening in her social network use.
- Financial Control Behavior Index - A z-score constructed by averaging z-scores of dummy variables equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have experienced an act of violence from the last (any) intimate partner of the following categories: (i) preventing from working; (ii) refusing to give her money; (iii) taking her earnings.
- Gender Attitudes Index - A z-score constructed by averaging z-scores of dummy variables equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with following statements: (i) women should not argue with their partners; (ii) women can spend their own money; (iii) men should also do housework; (iv) children can sometimes be beaten; (v) male family members are responsible for the females; (vi) violence from partners can be justified in certain situations; (vii) women can refuse sex with partners.
- Employed - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent was employed last week, and 0 otherwise.
- Employed in Agriculture - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent was employed in agricultural sector last week, and 0 otherwise.
- Employed in Service - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent was employed in service sector last week, and 0 otherwise.
- Social Security - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has social security, and 0 otherwise.
- Ownership Index - A z-score constructed by averaging z-scores of dummy variables equal to 1 if the respondent has access to income from following: (i) land; (ii) house; (iii) company; (iv) vehicle; (v) savings account(s); (vi) other sources.
- Marriage Age - Respondent's age at the beginning of the first marriage.
- Marriage Decision - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the marriage decision respondent belonged to the respondent rather than a family member, etc., and 0 otherwise.

- Partner Employed - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent's partner was employed last week, and 0 otherwise.
- Partner Schooling - Number of school years the respondent's partner has completed.
- Schooling Difference - Difference of the number of school years the partner has completed less the number of school years the respondent has completed.
- Partner's College Completion Rate - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent's partner completed at least 16 years of schooling, and 0 otherwise.
- Partner's High School Completion Rate - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent's partner completed at least 12 years of schooling, and 0 otherwise.
- Age Difference - Difference of the respondent's and her partner's age.
- Partner's Age - Respondent's partner's age.
- Partner's Addictive Behavior Index - A z-score constructed by averaging z-scores of dummy variables equal to 1 if the respondent's partner: (i) does not use alcohol; (ii) does not gamble; (iii) does not do drugs; (iv) has no affair with other women.
- Partner's Mother Faced Violence - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent's partner witnessed his mother facing violence from her partner(s), and 0 otherwise.
- Partner Experienced Violence - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent's partner experienced violence from family members as a child, and 0 otherwise.
- Divorced - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has been divorced, and 0 otherwise.
- Remarried - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has remarried, and 0 otherwise.
- Household Asset Ownership Index - A z-score constructed by averaging z-scores of dummy variables equal to 1 if the respondent's household contains: (i) Refrigerator; (ii) Deep freezer; (iii) Gas or electric oven; (iv) Microwave oven; (v) Dishwasher; (vi) Garbage dispenser; (vii) Washing machine; (viii) Drying machine; (ix) Iron; (x) Vacuum cleaner; (xi) LCD/Plasma television; (xii) Home theater; (xiii) Television; (xiv) Satellite TV; (xv) Paid TV service; (xvi) DVD/VCR player; (xvii) Cell phone;

(xviii) Telephone (non-mobile); (xix) Laptop/tablet computer ; (xx) Desktop computer; (xxi) Internet connection; (xxii) Air conditioner; (xxiii) Private car; (xxiv) Taxi/minibus/bus/other commercial vehicles; (xxv) Tractor.

- Mother Tongue: Non-Turkish - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent's mother tongue is not Turkish, and 0 otherwise.
- Childhood Region: Village - A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent grew up in a village until the age of 12, and 0 otherwise.
- Childhood Region: North/West/South/Central/East - Dummy variables equal to 1 if the respondent grew up in Northern/Western/Southern/Central/Eastern Anatolia until the age of 12, and 0 otherwise.

Table A.1: Treatment Effects on Schooling (Static Bandwidth)

VARIABLES	(1) Linear RD $\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(2) Quadratic RD $\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(3) Linear RD $\hat{h}/2$ bandwidth	(4) Linear RD $2\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(5) BW	(6) Obs.	(7) Mean
<hr/> SAMPLE OF ALL WOMEN <hr/>							
Years of Schooling	0.902*** (0.343)	0.568 (0.505)	0.518 (0.475)	0.981*** (0.264)	98	2,688	8.44
Junior Highschool	0.207*** (0.037)	0.176*** (0.056)	0.154*** (0.055)	0.200*** (0.028)	98	2,549	0.63
Highschool	0.097** (0.043)	0.102 (0.062)	0.086 (0.056)	0.195*** (0.037)	98	2,549	0.42
College	0.038 (0.029)	0.002 (0.041)	0.012 (0.037)	0.018 (0.022)	98	2,549	0.15
<hr/> SAMPLE OF WOMEN WHO HAVE HAD A RELATIONSHIP <hr/>							
Years of Schooling	0.825** (0.349)	0.626 (0.512)	0.553 (0.476)	0.742*** (0.270)	98	2,451	8.28
Junior Highschool	0.217*** (0.039)	0.179*** (0.058)	0.161*** (0.057)	0.206*** (0.030)	98	2,319	0.61
Highschool	0.108** (0.046)	0.112* (0.064)	0.092 (0.056)	0.142*** (0.038)	98	2,319	0.40
College	0.010 (0.029)	0.003 (0.042)	0.003 (0.037)	-0.004 (0.022)	98	2,319	0.14

*Note:* Columns (1)-(4) list RD point estimates for different bandwidths. Columns (5)-(7) report the static bandwidth, number of observations and sample means, respectively. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table A.2: Treatment Effects on Schooling by Childhood Region (Static Bandwidth)

VARIABLES	(1) Linear RD $\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(2) Quadratic RD $\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(3) Linear RD $\hat{h}/2$ bandwidth	(4) Linear RD $2\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(5) BW	(6) Obs.	(7) Mean
GREW UP IN VILLAGE							
Years of Schooling	1.760*** (0.542)	1.190 (0.775)	1.072 (0.772)	1.411*** (0.443)	98	893	6.65
Junior Highschool Completion Rate	0.388*** (0.070)	0.305*** (0.111)	0.285** (0.110)	0.360*** (0.057)	98	816	0.42
Highschool Completion Rate	0.250*** (0.073)	0.175* (0.105)	0.106 (0.098)	0.252*** (0.060)	98	816	0.23
College	0.108** (0.042)	0.057 (0.065)	0.043 (0.063)	0.080** (0.034)	98	816	0.07
GREW UP IN NON-VILLAGE							
Years of Schooling	0.414 (0.383)	0.494 (0.559)	0.379 (0.505)	0.348 (0.306)	98	1,558	9.07
Junior Highschool Completion Rate	0.144*** (0.043)	0.136** (0.064)	0.111* (0.063)	0.131*** (0.034)	98	1,503	0.70
Highschool Completion Rate	0.048 (0.053)	0.092 (0.071)	0.092 (0.065)	0.081* (0.045)	98	1,503	0.48
College	-0.028 (0.037)	-0.005 (0.054)	-0.004 (0.050)	-0.044 (0.029)	98	1,503	0.18

*Note:* Columns (1)-(4) list RD point estimates for different bandwidths. Columns (5)-(7) report the static bandwidth, number of observations and sample means, respectively. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table A.3: Treatment Effects on Violence Outcomes from Last Partner (Static Bandwidth)

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Physical Violence	-0.027*** (0.004)	-0.160** (0.062)	-0.195* (0.104)	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.239** (0.104)	-0.136** (0.068)
Mean	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,449	2,449	2,449	893	893	893
Severe Physical Violence	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.171** (0.070)	-0.209* (0.117)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.350*** (0.111)	-0.199** (0.083)
Mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,449	2,449	2,449	893	893	893
Mild Physical Violence	-0.035*** (0.005)	-0.149** (0.068)	-0.182* (0.102)	-0.024** (0.012)	-0.128 (0.118)	-0.073 (0.067)
Mean	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,448	2,448	2,448	892	892	892
Psychological Violence	-0.022*** (0.005)	-0.127* (0.073)	-0.155 (0.094)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.184 (0.111)	-0.104 (0.065)
Mean	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,449	2,449	2,449	893	893	893
Sexual Violence	-0.021*** (0.004)	-0.150** (0.069)	-0.182* (0.102)	-0.014* (0.009)	-0.224* (0.119)	-0.127 (0.078)
Mean	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,449	2,449	2,449	893	893	893
Social Control Behaviour	-0.021*** (0.004)	-0.045 (0.057)	-0.055 (0.067)	-0.015* (0.008)	-0.005 (0.088)	-0.003 (0.049)
Mean	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.09
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,449	2,449	2,449	893	893	893
Financial Control Behaviour	-0.025*** (0.004)	-0.052 (0.065)	-0.064 (0.079)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.097 (0.114)	-0.057 (0.064)
Mean	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,422	2,422	2,422	884	884	884

*Note:* Columns (1)-(3) list OLS estimates, sharp RD and fuzzy RD point estimates, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) report the above mentioned estimates for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Sample means, static IK bandwidth and number of observations are reported below. All regressions include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table A.4: Treatment Effects on Violence Outcomes from Any Partner (Static Bandwidth)

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Physical Violence	-0.023*** (0.005)	-0.127** (0.059)	-0.154* (0.092)	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.189* (0.100)	-0.107* (0.064)
Mean	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,449	2,449	2,449	893	893	893
Severe Physical Violence	-0.016*** (0.006)	-0.128* (0.070)	-0.156 (0.104)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.276*** (0.106)	-0.157** (0.074)
Mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,449	2,449	2,449	893	893	893
Mild Physical Violence	-0.031*** (0.006)	-0.125* (0.064)	-0.152 (0.093)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.101 (0.113)	-0.058 (0.065)
Mean	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,449	2,449	2,449	893	893	893
Psychological Violence	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.102 (0.073)	-0.125 (0.091)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.140 (0.105)	-0.079 (0.061)
Mean	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,449	2,449	2,449	893	893	893
Sexual Violence	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.146** (0.070)	-0.177* (0.101)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.201* (0.115)	-0.114 (0.074)
Mean	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,449	2,449	2,449	893	893	893
Financial Control Behaviour	-0.023*** (0.004)	-0.049 (0.062)	-0.061 (0.074)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.061 (0.109)	-0.036 (0.061)
Mean	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,423	2,423	2,423	885	885	885

*Note:* Columns (1)-(3) list OLS estimates, sharp RD and fuzzy RD point estimates, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) report the above mentioned estimates for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Sample means, static IK bandwidth and number of observations are reported below. All regressions include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table A.5: Treatment Effects on Gender Attitudes (Static Bandwidth)

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Disagree: a woman should not argue with her husband	0.035*** (0.003)	0.035 (0.048)	0.045 (0.058)	0.043*** (0.005)	0.077 (0.079)	0.047 (0.045)
Mean	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.59	0.59	0.59
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,427	2,427	2,427	879	879	879
Agree: a woman can spend her own money	0.017*** (0.003)	-0.051 (0.040)	-0.060 (0.057)	0.013** (0.005)	-0.067 (0.080)	-0.038 (0.049)
Mean	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.66	0.66	0.66
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,422	2,422	2,422	883	883	883
Agree: men should also do housework	0.023*** (0.003)	-0.046 (0.038)	-0.055 (0.057)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.003 (0.074)	0.001 (0.041)
Mean	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.68	0.68	0.68
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,439	2,439	2,439	887	887	887
Disagree: children can be beaten	0.018*** (0.003)	0.000 (0.035)	0.000 (0.041)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.031 (0.070)	0.018 (0.039)
Mean	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.69	0.69	0.69
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,438	2,438	2,438	889	889	889
Disagree: men are responsible for women's actions	0.030*** (0.003)	-0.020 (0.040)	-0.028 (0.061)	0.032*** (0.006)	-0.006 (0.068)	-0.004 (0.045)
Mean	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.56	0.56	0.56
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,403	2,403	2,403	874	874	874
Disagree: men can use violence in certain situations	0.025*** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.046)	-0.004 (0.046)	0.019*** (0.006)	0.051 (0.090)	0.029 (0.051)
Mean	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.59	0.59	0.59
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,325	2,325	2,325	844	844	844
Disagree: women cannot refuse having sex if husband wants	0.002** (0.001)	0.013 (0.012)	0.015 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.042* (0.023)	0.024* (0.014)
Mean	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.97	0.97	0.97
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,437	2,437	2,437	885	885	885
Gender attitudes index	0.046*** (0.003)	-0.016 (0.041)	-0.019 (0.053)	0.042*** (0.006)	0.064 (0.073)	0.037 (0.038)
Mean	0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,451	2,451	2,451	893	893	893

*Note:* Columns (1)-(3) list OLS estimates, sharp RD and fuzzy RD point estimates, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) report the above mentioned estimates for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Sample means, static IK bandwidth and number of observations are reported below. All regressions include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table A.6: Treatment Effects on Labor Market Outcomes (Static Bandwidth)

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Employed	0.033*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.036)	0.005 (0.043)	0.021*** (0.005)	-0.043 (0.057)	-0.024 (0.033)
Mean	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.25
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,286	2,286	2,286	818	818	818
Employed in agriculture	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.032 (0.028)	-0.018 (0.017)
Mean	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,451	2,451	2,451	893	893	893
Employed in service	0.040*** (0.003)	0.009 (0.035)	0.010 (0.039)	0.027*** (0.004)	0.027 (0.047)	0.015 (0.025)
Mean	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.15
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,451	2,451	2,451	893	893	893
Social security	0.040*** (0.003)	0.035 (0.032)	0.042 (0.035)	0.029*** (0.005)	0.058 (0.040)	0.033 (0.023)
Mean	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.13	0.13	0.13
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,451	2,451	2,451	893	893	893
Ownership index	0.025*** (0.004)	-0.051 (0.042)	-0.061 (0.062)	0.024*** (0.006)	-0.047 (0.061)	-0.027 (0.036)
Mean	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,451	2,451	2,451	893	893	893

*Note:* Columns (1)-(3) list OLS estimates, sharp RD and fuzzy RD point estimates, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) report the above mentioned estimates for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Sample means, static IK bandwidth and number of observations are reported below. All regressions include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table A.7: Treatment Effects on Marriage Outcomes (Static Bandwidth)

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Marriage age	0.434*** (0.023)	0.560* (0.311)	0.852 (0.560)	0.353*** (0.037)	0.592 (0.465)	0.420 (0.325)
Mean	20.65	20.65	20.65	20.21	20.21	20.21
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,184	2,184	2,184	831	831	831
Marriage decision	0.040*** (0.003)	0.106*** (0.040)	0.163* (0.093)	0.043*** (0.006)	0.263*** (0.064)	0.188*** (0.072)
Mean	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.48	0.48	0.48
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,187	2,187	2,187	833	833	833
Partner employed	-0.001 (0.002)	0.083*** (0.025)	0.101** (0.049)	0.007* (0.004)	0.057 (0.044)	0.032 (0.024)
Mean	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.91	0.91
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,444	2,444	2,444	643	643	643
Partner schooling	0.568*** (0.022)	0.711** (0.320)	0.912** (0.394)	0.464*** (0.038)	1.675*** (0.505)	0.996*** (0.305)
Mean	9.43	9.43	9.43	8.37	8.37	8.37
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,432	2,432	2,432	886	886	886
Schooling difference	-0.432*** (0.022)	-0.068 (0.328)	-0.088 (0.394)	-0.536*** (0.038)	-0.007 (0.527)	-0.004 (0.305)
Mean	1.15	1.15	1.15	1.72	1.72	1.72
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,432	2,432	2,432	886	886	886
Partner's college completion rate	0.054*** (0.003)	-0.021 (0.039)	-0.026 (0.051)	0.040*** (0.004)	0.059 (0.056)	0.034 (0.028)
Mean	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.16	0.16	0.16
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,451	2,451	2,451	893	893	893
Partner's high school completion rate	0.053*** (0.003)	0.049 (0.042)	0.060 (0.048)	0.048*** (0.005)	0.137* (0.078)	0.078* (0.044)
Mean	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.47	0.47	0.47
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,451	2,451	2,451	893	893	893
Partner's age	-0.121*** (0.036)	-0.234 (0.413)	-0.360 (0.637)	-0.127** (0.054)	-0.762 (0.844)	-0.549 (0.590)
Mean	33.95	33.95	33.95	34.21	34.21	34.21
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,181	2,181	2,181	828	828	828
Partner's addictive behavior index	-0.012** (0.005)	0.013 (0.075)	0.016 (0.092)	-0.021** (0.010)	-0.057 (0.100)	-0.032 (0.054)
Mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.07	0.07
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	2,447	2,447	2,447	892	892	892
Partner experienced violence	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.099** (0.042)	-0.177 (0.126)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.081 (0.078)	-0.049 (0.047)
Mean	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98
Observations	1,992	1,992	1,992	723	723	723
Divorced	0.001 (0.002)	-0.016 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.034)	0.004 (0.004)	0.007 (0.029)	0.005 (0.020)
Mean	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06
Bandwidth	98	98	98	98	98	98

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Table A.7 – continued from previous page

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Observations	2,187	2,187	2,187	833	833	833

*Note:* Columns (1)-(3) list OLS estimates, sharp RD and fuzzy RD point estimates, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) report the above mentioned estimates for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Sample means, static IK bandwidth and number of observations are reported below. All regressions include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table A.8: Treatment Effects on Schooling (CCT Bandwidth)

VARIABLES	(1) Linear RD $\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(2) Quadratic RD $\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(3) Linear RD $\hat{h}/2$ bandwidth	(4) Linear RD $2\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(5) BW	(6) Obs.	(7) Mean
<hr/> SAMPLE OF ALL WOMEN <hr/>							
Years of schooling	0.630 (0.440)	0.004 (0.653)	0.003 (0.569)	0.817** (0.316)	57	1,553	8.41
Junior high school	0.198*** (0.048)	0.082 (0.072)	0.052 (0.072)	0.210*** (0.033)	62	1,585	0.63
High school	0.115** (0.049)	0.083 (0.071)	0.104 (0.063)	0.214*** (0.039)	75	1,903	0.42
College	0.041 (0.033)	-0.047 (0.047)	-0.003 (0.044)	0.038 (0.024)	69	1,746	0.16
<hr/> SAMPLE OF WOMEN WHO HAVE HAD A RELATIONSHIP <hr/>							
Years of schooling	0.642 (0.446)	-0.064 (0.655)	0.123 (0.595)	0.707** (0.323)	57	1,369	8.28
Junior high school	0.200*** (0.048)	0.096 (0.074)	0.087 (0.074)	0.227*** (0.035)	62	1,506	0.63
High school	0.096* (0.055)	0.018 (0.080)	0.076 (0.065)	0.159*** (0.040)	75	1,243	0.41
College	0.018 (0.034)	-0.017 (0.048)	0.009 (0.047)	0.013 (0.025)	69	1,472	0.15

*Note:* Columns (1)-(4) list RD point estimates for different bandwidths. Columns (5)-(7) report optimal CCT bandwidths, number of observations and sample means, respectively. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table A.9: Treatment Effects on Schooling by Childhood Region (CCT Bandwidth)

VARIABLES	(1) Linear RD $\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(2) Quadratic RD $\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(3) Linear RD $\hat{h}/2$ bandwidth	(4) Linear RD $2\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(5) BW	(6) Obs.	(7) Mean
<b>GREW UP IN VILLAGE</b>							
Years of schooling	1.366* (0.772)	0.088 (1.092)	0.515 (1.165)	1.705*** (0.530)	52	471	6.74
Junior high school	0.398*** (0.083)	0.240* (0.138)	0.249* (0.132)	0.367*** (0.060)	72	584	0.45
High school	0.154* (0.091)	0.073 (0.140)	0.155 (0.147)	0.230*** (0.069)	56	461	0.25
College	0.083 (0.055)	0.032 (0.072)	0.067 (0.068)	0.096** (0.038)	61	503	0.07
<b>GREW UP IN NON-VILLAGE</b>							
Years of schooling	0.367 (0.464)	-0.113 (0.719)	-0.094 (0.672)	0.309 (0.357)	57	939	9.06
Junior high school	0.161*** (0.050)	0.003 (0.081)	0.042 (0.085)	0.151*** (0.036)	68	1,056	0.71
High school	0.088 (0.062)	0.034 (0.095)	0.036 (0.064)	0.045 (0.051)	55	869	0.48
College	-0.021 (0.046)	-0.005 (0.073)	-0.058 (0.069)	-0.025 (0.036)	53	837	0.19

*Note:* Columns (1)-(4) list RD point estimates for different bandwidths. Columns (5)-(7) report optimal CCT bandwidths, number of observations and sample means, respectively. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table A.10: Treatment Effects on Violence Outcomes from Last Partner(CCT Bandwidth)

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Physical Violence	-0.026*** (0.005)	-0.182** (0.071)	-0.200* (0.108)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.286** (0.120)	-0.168* (0.096)
Mean	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bandwidth	75	75	75	72	72	72
Observations	1,877	1,877	1,877	646	646	646
Severe Physical Violence	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.254*** (0.090)	-0.348* (0.208)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.315** (0.123)	-0.181** (0.089)
Mean	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03
Bandwidth	65	65	65	80	80	80
Observations	1,653	1,653	1,653	728	728	728
Mild Physical Violence	-0.035*** (0.005)	-0.158** (0.067)	-0.201* (0.109)	-0.024* (0.012)	-0.190 (0.135)	-0.113 (0.093)
Mean	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Bandwidth	105	105	105	70	70	70
Observations	2,573	2,573	2,573	632	632	632
Psychological Violence	-0.024*** (0.005)	-0.152** (0.077)	-0.163* (0.090)	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.207* (0.115)	-0.106* (0.062)
Mean	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
Bandwidth	83	83	83	84	84	84
Observations	2,107	2,107	2,107	772	772	772
Sexual Violence	-0.021*** (0.004)	-0.173** (0.074)	-0.191* (0.101)	-0.015* (0.009)	-0.230* (0.126)	-0.135 (0.084)
Mean	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
Bandwidth	84	84	84	95	95	95
Observations	2,124	2,124	2,124	870	870	870
Social Control Behaviour	-0.023*** (0.004)	-0.047 (0.060)	-0.050 (0.063)	-0.015* (0.008)	-0.001 (0.110)	-0.001 (0.079)
Mean	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.10	0.10
Bandwidth	81	81	81	61	61	61
Observations	2,042	2,042	2,042	560	560	560
Financial Control Behaviour	-0.026*** (0.004)	-0.070 (0.081)	-0.086 (0.096)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.033 (0.155)	-0.028 (0.127)
Mean	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Bandwidth	72	72	72	58	58	58
Observations	1,787	1,787	1,787	519	519	519

*Note:* Columns (1)-(3) list OLS estimates, sharp RD and fuzzy RD point estimates, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) report the above mentioned estimates for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Sample means, optimal CCT bandwidths and number of observations are reported below. All regressions include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table A.11: Treatment Effects on Violence Outcomes from Any Partner (CCT Bandwidth)

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Physical Violence	-0.023*** (0.006)	-0.174** (0.072)	-0.204* (0.117)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.189 (0.142)	-0.165 (0.169)
Mean	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bandwidth	70	70	70	60	60	60
Observations	1,761	1,761	1,761	541	541	541
Severe Physical Violence	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.197** (0.089)	-0.270 (0.177)	0.004 (0.012)	-0.282* (0.144)	-0.211 (0.157)
Mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bandwidth	96	96	96	61	61	61
Observations	2,419	2,419	2,419	560	560	560
Mild Physical Violence	-0.034*** (0.006)	-0.183*** (0.069)	-0.193** (0.098)	-0.021* (0.012)	-0.181 (0.135)	-0.122 (0.111)
Mean	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
Bandwidth	81	81	81	64	64	64
Observations	2,042	2,042	2,042	590	590	590
Psychological Violence	-0.021*** (0.006)	-0.187** (0.086)	-0.219* (0.125)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.164 (0.103)	-0.091 (0.060)
Mean	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Bandwidth	70	70	70	98	98	98
Observations	1,761	1,761	1,761	890	890	890
Sexual Violence	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.173** (0.075)	-0.185* (0.098)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.232* (0.125)	-0.117 (0.072)
Mean	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bandwidth	83	83	83	87	87	87
Observations	2,107	2,107	2,107	798	798	798
Financial Control Behaviour	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.072 (0.076)	-0.088 (0.089)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.052 (0.145)	0.045 (0.123)
Mean	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
Bandwidth	71	71	71	59	59	59
Observations	1,762	1,762	1,762	530	530	530

*Note:* Columns (1)-(3) list OLS estimates, sharp RD and fuzzy RD point estimates, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) report the above mentioned estimates for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Sample means, optimal CCT bandwidths and number of observations are reported below. All regressions include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table A.12: Treatment Effects on Gender Attitudes (CCT Bandwidth)

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Disagree: a woman should not argue with her husband	0.035*** (0.003)	-0.013 (0.057)	-0.023 (0.102)	0.040*** (0.008)	0.024 (0.102)	0.022 (0.086)
Mean	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.61	0.61	0.61
Bandwidth	58	58	58	56	56	56
Observations	1,466	1,466	1,466	499	499	499
Agree: a woman can spend her own money	0.020*** (0.003)	-0.087* (0.045)	-0.128 (0.107)	0.009 (0.007)	-0.201* (0.103)	-0.149 (0.123)
Mean	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.66	0.66	0.66
Bandwidth	65	65	65	54	54	54
Observations	1,638	1,638	1,638	480	480	480
Agree: men should also do housework	0.021*** (0.003)	-0.070 (0.045)	-0.082 (0.072)	0.019*** (0.006)	-0.028 (0.084)	-0.019 (0.057)
Mean	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.67	0.67	0.67
Bandwidth	71	71	71	66	66	66
Observations	1,772	1,772	1,772	599	599	599
Disagree: children can be beaten	0.018*** (0.003)	0.021 (0.040)	0.025 (0.048)	0.027*** (0.007)	0.011 (0.092)	0.008 (0.063)
Mean	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.67	0.67	0.67
Bandwidth	66	66	66	62	62	62
Observations	1,661	1,661	1,661	564	564	564
Disagree: men are responsible for women's actions	0.032*** (0.003)	-0.008 (0.048)	-0.009 (0.056)	0.033*** (0.007)	0.052 (0.072)	0.035 (0.048)
Mean	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.56	0.56	0.56
Bandwidth	80	80	80	73	73	73
Observations	1,973	1,973	1,973	648	648	648
Disagree: men can use violence in certain situations	0.025*** (0.003)	0.046 (0.055)	0.044 (0.052)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.076 (0.099)	0.045 (0.061)
Mean	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.59	0.59	0.59
Bandwidth	69	69	69	77	77	77
Observations	1,644	1,644	1,644	665	665	665
Disagree: women cannot refuse having sex if husband wants	0.003** (0.001)	0.007 (0.013)	0.009 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.034 (0.027)	0.021 (0.018)
Mean	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.97	0.97	0.97
Bandwidth	64	64	64	64	64	64
Observations	1,617	1,617	1,617	584	584	584
Gender attitudes index	0.047*** (0.004)	-0.003 (0.048)	-0.005 (0.064)	0.046*** (0.007)	0.040 (0.087)	0.027 (0.054)
Mean	0.05	0.05	0.05	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09
Bandwidth	63	63	63	65	65	65
Observations	1,600	1,600	1,600	597	597	597

*Note:* Columns (1)-(3) list OLS estimates, sharp RD and fuzzy RD point estimates, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) report the above mentioned estimates for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Sample means, optimal CCT bandwidths and number of observations are reported below. All regressions include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table A.13: Treatment Effects on Labor Market Outcomes (CCT Bandwidth)

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Employed	0.033*** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.036)	-0.006 (0.052)	0.017*** (0.006)	-0.013 (0.066)	-0.008 (0.040)
Mean	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.22	0.22	0.22
Bandwidth	101	101	101	65	65	65
Observations	2,325	2,325	2,325	546	546	546
Employed in agriculture	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.025)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.036 (0.032)	-0.021 (0.019)
Mean	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.04
Bandwidth	55	55	55	79	79	79
Observations	1,395	1,395	1,395	720	720	720
Employed in service	0.041*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.038)	0.003 (0.039)	0.026*** (0.005)	0.056 (0.052)	0.031 (0.028)
Mean	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.14	0.14	0.14
Bandwidth	85	85	85	78	78	78
Observations	2,155	2,155	2,155	712	712	712
Social security	0.041*** (0.003)	0.057 (0.038)	0.069* (0.041)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.049 (0.061)	0.043 (0.050)
Mean	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.09	0.09	0.09
Bandwidth	71	71	71	49	49	49
Observations	1,780	1,780	1,780	441	441	441
Ownership index	0.027*** (0.004)	-0.051 (0.043)	-0.064 (0.067)	0.018*** (0.006)	-0.131* (0.075)	-0.093 (0.075)
Mean	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09
Bandwidth	93	93	93	62	62	62
Observations	2,334	2,334	2,334	567	567	567

*Note:* Columns (1)-(3) list OLS estimates, sharp RD and fuzzy RD point estimates, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) report the above mentioned estimates for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Sample means, optimal CCT bandwidths and number of observations are reported below. All regressions include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table A.14: Treatment Effects on Marriage Outcomes (CCT Bandwidth)

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Marriage age	0.388*** (0.028)	0.261 (0.464)	0.707 (1.415)	0.352*** (0.041)	0.759 (0.504)	0.570 (0.397)
Mean	20.31	20.31	20.31	20.17	20.17	20.17
Bandwidth	45	45	45	81	81	81
Observations	1,047	1,047	1,047	691	691	691
Marriage decision	0.038*** (0.004)	0.118** (0.057)	0.182 (0.134)	0.037*** (0.007)	0.262*** (0.091)	0.219* (0.119)
Mean	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.51	0.51	0.51
Bandwidth	52	52	52	57	57	57
Observations	1,201	1,201	1,201	484	484	484
Partner employed	-0.000 (0.002)	0.091*** (0.028)	0.098** (0.044)	0.007 (0.005)	0.074 (0.056)	0.043 (0.030)
Mean	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92
Bandwidth	82	82	82	72	72	72
Observations	2,071	2,071	2,071	643	643	643
Partner schooling	0.566*** (0.028)	0.322 (0.435)	0.539 (0.599)	0.447*** (0.048)	1.676** (0.669)	1.119** (0.466)
Mean	9.51	9.51	9.51	8.49	8.49	8.49
Bandwidth	55	55	55	69	69	69
Observations	1,388	1,388	1,388	619	619	619
Schooling difference	-0.438*** (0.023)	-0.107 (0.338)	-0.144 (0.411)	-0.563*** (0.048)	-0.238 (0.841)	-0.197 (0.610)
Mean	1.12	1.12	1.12	1.79	1.79	1.79
Bandwidth	90	90	90	55	55	55
Observations	2,240	2,240	2,240	490	490	490
Partner's college completion rate	0.054*** (0.003)	-0.064 (0.043)	-0.073 (0.069)	0.042*** (0.006)	0.023 (0.069)	0.015 (0.041)
Mean	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.16	0.16	0.16
Bandwidth	73	73	73	66	66	66
Observations	1,842	1,842	1,842	602	602	602
Partner's high school completion rate	0.054*** (0.004)	0.000 (0.058)	0.001 (0.088)	0.048*** (0.006)	0.079 (0.119)	0.056 (0.079)
Mean	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.48	0.48	0.48
Bandwidth	54	54	54	62	62	62
Observations	1,369	1,369	1,369	567	567	567
Age difference	-0.096** (0.044)	-0.632 (0.443)	-0.857 (0.737)	-0.006 (0.067)	-0.679 (0.963)	-0.629 (0.892)
Mean	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.39	4.39	4.39
Bandwidth	72	72	72	60	60	60
Observations	1,635	1,635	1,635	500	500	500
Partner's age	-0.096** (0.044)	-0.632 (0.443)	-0.857 (0.737)	-0.006 (0.067)	-0.679 (0.963)	-0.629 (0.892)
Mean	33.15	33.15	33.15	32.88	32.88	32.88
Bandwidth	72	72	72	60	60	60
Observations	1,635	1,635	1,635	500	500	500
Partner's addictive behavior index	-0.013* (0.007)	0.143 (0.089)	0.196 (0.178)	-0.021** (0.009)	0.055 (0.118)	0.037 (0.083)
Mean	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.11	0.11	0.11
Bandwidth	64	64	64	64	64	64
Observations	1,624	1,624	1,624	589	589	589
Partner experienced violence	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.126*** (0.044)	-0.195 (0.122)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.066 (0.095)	-0.044 (0.061)
Mean	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.27	0.27	0.27
Bandwidth	80	80	80	71	71	71

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VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Observations	1,645	1,645	1,645	522	522	522
Divorced	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.033 (0.022)	-0.047 (0.041)	0.010** (0.004)	0.006 (0.044)	0.005 (0.035)
Mean	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04
Bandwidth	61	61	61	51	51	51
Observations	1,419	1,419	1,419	434	434	434
Remarried	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.017 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.024)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.004 (0.036)	0.003 (0.024)
Mean	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Bandwidth	67	67	67	62	62	62
Observations	1,690	1,690	1,690	567	567	567
Household asset ownership index	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.047 (0.040)	-0.071 (0.076)	-0.006 (0.011)	0.097 (0.150)	0.072 (0.111)
Mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Bandwidth	56	56	56	61	61	61
Observations	1,426	1,426	1,426	560	560	560

*Note:* Columns (1)-(3) list OLS estimates, sharp RD and fuzzy RD point estimates, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) report the above mentioned estimates for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Sample means, optimal CCT bandwidths and number of observations are reported below. All regressions include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. +++, ++, + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels based on Simes-adjusted p-values (Simes (1986)), respectively.

Table A.15: Treatment Effects on Schooling (2008 Survey Data)

VARIABLES	(1) Linear RD $\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(2) Quadratic RD $\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(3) Linear RD $\hat{h}/2$ bandwidth	(4) Linear RD $2\hat{h}$ bandwidth	(5) BW	(6) Obs.	(7) Mean
<hr/> SAMPLE OF WOMEN WHO HAVE HAD A RELATIONSHIP <hr/>							
Years of Schooling	1.192*** (0.337)	0.938* (0.488)	0.891* (0.477)	1.334*** (0.270)	63	2,078	8.47
Junior Highschool Completion Rate	0.232*** (0.044)	0.168** (0.072)	0.174** (0.068)	0.231*** (0.036)	74	2439	0.62
Highschool Completion Rate	0.145** (0.056)	0.120 (0.082)	0.002 (0.071)	0.300*** (0.049)	44	1,474	0.43
<hr/> SAMPLE OF WOMEN WHO GREW UP IN VILLAGE <hr/>							
Years of Schooling	1.468*** (0.506)	0.363 (0.740)	1.290* (0.734)	1.719*** (0.429)	74	762	7.23
Junior Highschool Completion Rate	0.384*** (0.070)	0.273** (0.112)	0.312*** (0.096)	0.423*** (0.060)	93	940	0.41
Highschool Completion Rate	0.092 (0.103)	-0.151 (0.123)	-0.123 (0.125)	0.241*** (0.083)	49	487	0.26

*Note:* Data source is 2008 TNSDVW. Columns (1)-(4) list RD point estimates for different bandwidths. Columns (5)-(7) report the IK bandwidth, number of observations and sample means, respectively. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively.

Table A.16: Treatment Effects on Violence Outcomes from Any Partner (2008 Survey Data)

VARIABLES	ALL WOMEN			VILLAGE		
	(1) OLS	(2) Sharp RD	(3) Fuzzy RD	(4) OLS	(5) Sharp RD	(6) Fuzzy RD
Physical Violence	-0.018*** (0.004)	0.025 (0.056)	0.023 (0.049)	-0.028*** (0.008)	-0.015 (0.086)	-0.013 (0.067)
Mean	-0.17	-0.17	-0.17	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13
Bandwidth	60	60	60	76	76	76
Observations	1993	2103	1993	783	855	783
Severe Physical Violence	-0.005 (0.005)	0.056 (0.062)	0.046 (0.049)	-0.014* (0.009)	-0.048 (0.086)	-0.036 (0.068)
Mean	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
Bandwidth	64	64	64	66	66	66
Observations	2102	2217	2102	670	730	670
Mild Physical Violence	-0.027*** (0.005)	0.064 (0.066)	0.059 (0.061)	-0.029*** (0.010)	0.006 (0.100)	0.013 (0.067)
Mean	-0.23	-0.23	-0.23	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13
Bandwidth	63	63	63	114	114	114
Observations	2068	2179	2068	1117	1232	1117
Psychological Violence	-0.007 (0.006)	0.133* (0.077)	0.111 (0.070)	-0.024*** (0.009)	0.058 (0.106)	0.055 (0.071)
Mean	-0.15	-0.15	-0.15	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
Bandwidth	66	66	66	98	98	98
Observations	2168	2284	2168	979	1077	979
Sexual Violence	-0.015*** (0.005)	0.07 (0.059)	0.054 (0.054)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.133 (0.100)	0.086 (0.065)
Mean	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09
Bandwidth	57	57	57	119	119	119
Observations	1886	1988	1886	1183	1308	1183
Financial Control Behaviour	-0.017*** (0.005)	0.083 (0.088)	0.08 (0.088)	-0.019** (0.008)	0.270* (0.154)	0.191 (0.126)
Mean	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
Bandwidth	62	62	62	110	110	110
Observations	1938	2046	1938	1053	1163	1053

*Note:* Data source is 2008 TNSDVW. Columns (1)-(3) list OLS estimates, sharp RD and fuzzy RD point estimates, respectively. Columns (4)-(6) report the above mentioned estimates for the subsample of women who grew up in a village. Sample means, static IK bandwidth and number of observations are reported below. All regressions include only women who have ever had a relationship. All specifications include month of birth fixed effects, childhood region fixed effects and childhood village dummy and the interaction of the latter two as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year cohort level and reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively.